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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the continuing development of a union's duty to 
fairly represent its members, the duty owed by a union to its members based 
upon negligence principles and the recent development of the duty to 
accommodate in the field of human rights legislation. 
As the federal govemment and seven of the ten Canadian provinces 
moved to codiw the union duty of fair representation the lower courts saw 
a continuing need for judicial supervision in the area of intra-union conflict. 
However, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have willingly accepted 
ouster of the courts' inherent jurisdiction in favour of statutory mbunals. 1 
critically assess those cases in which the courts concluded their jurisdiction 
was ousted. 
1 also trace the development of the duty to accommodate union 
members in circumstances where the union is guiity of adverse affect 
discrimination. 1 criticaily assess those circumstances where the courts have 
allowed an extension of the jurisdiction of human rights mbunals based upon 
what 1 refer to as administrative tribunal (as opposed to judicial) lawmaking. 
The analysis of the courts' willingness to accept ouster of its 
jurisdiction in the field of intra-union conflict and its willingness to permit 
human rights tribunals to expand their own jurisdiction sets the stage for a 
cal1 for less law making by tribunals and a greater willingness by the courts 
to recognize that tribunals do not possess any jurisdiction other than that 
afforded by the Legislator . 
Without the help and assistance of the folIowing persons this thesis 
would never have been possible: 
Professor Emeritus W .H. Charles 
Professors Bruce Archibald and Innis Christie 
My spouse and partner Maureen Greer Bell, and our children 
Stephanie, Shawn, Rory, Ryan and Patrick 
Mrs. Sheila Wile 
The staff at the Weldon Law Library, Dalhousie University 
My former partner John A. Buchanan, late of Fredericton, New 
Brunswick, who passed away July 4, 1994. This thesis is dedicated 
to his memory. 
Introduction 
The purpuse of this thesis is to criticaliy examine the responsibility of 
trade unions toward their members within the context of recent judicial 
developments in the fields of a union's duty of fair representation toward its 
members as well as its duty to accommodate members. I have purposeiy 
avoided any detailed analysis of union unfair labour practices, the duty of 
fair representation as codified in various Provinces, and other legislative 
provisions that impose administrative requirements upon unions. 
In Chapter I, 1 outline the history, largely from American materials, 
of this duty of fair representation and place it within the context of other 
significant developments in common law jurisdictions . 
In Chapter II, 1 Ieave the reader a view of the varying standard of 
care flowing from a union's duty of fair representation in both Canada and 
the United States. 
In Chapter III, 1 attempt to make the case for the imposition of 
liability upon a trade union based upon mere negligence. 1 suggest there has 
been a misunderstanding in the application of decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in matters dealing with empioyer-union conflict. The 
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extrapolation of principles flowing fiom employer-union conflict to conflicts 
between the union and the employees (intra-union conflict) served by it, is 
not, with respect, a just and fair approach to intra union conflict. I am aided 
in this analysis by judgments from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan. 
In Chapter IV, 1 consider the development and application of the duty 
to accommodate as it relates to trade unions. The recent development of the 
duty to accommodate imposed upon unions in the human rights field will no 
doubt reduce the opportunities for the courts to M e r  develop and refine 
the duty of fair representation. While 1 am of the view that individual union 
members are disadvantaged by interpretations of the Courts requiring proof 
of gross negligence before a union is liable for its irnproper conduct, unions 
are thernselves disadvantaged as they attempt to identiv those circumstances 
in which they might have a duty to accommodate members while respecting 
collective agreements negotiated by them. 
In Chapter V, 1 use several recent cases to demonstrate why I believe 
the courts will be more inclined to limit the law making role with which 
certain labour mbunals have clothed themselves. This will foster the 
continued judicial development of tort duties owed by unions to their 
mernbers . 
Chapter VI represents a summary of the current state of the law in 
relation to issues surrounding intra-union conflict discussed in this paper. 
CHAPTER I 
The Development of a Duty of Fair Representation 
Black Americans hoping to benefit from the boom of the war years 
following the great conflict of 1939 - 1945 soon had their hopes and drearns 
shattered. Shattered by the very institutions that had been created to protect 
the working men and women of the western world. While union leaders 
espoused equality and fraternity for dl, those cries rang hollow to the 
millions of black men and women who hoped to share in the wealth of the 
post-war years. Black Americans often faced a hostile union leadership that 
placed linle value on the principle that dl men and women are created 
equally . 
When contract language in collective agreements, negotiated by white 
union leaders and white employers, forced black men to work at menial 
jobs, while supewisory positions were reserved for whites ody, no 
complaint was heard from white union leaders. When black men were 
systematically replaced by white men on less labour intensive tasks because 
of an allegedly valid contract between an employer and the union 
democratically elected to represent the workers, no complaint was heard 
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fiom union leaders. Majoratarianism was the standard response used to 
justiw intra-union discrimination. l 
The rationale for the hands-off approach by the union leaders was 
purportedly based upon principles of democracy and integrity. After ail, 
was a union not a collectivity designed to protect the interests of a majority 
of its members in ways it considered appropriate? Surely, the state had no 
interest in the intemal affairs of trade unions! And finally, was a trade 
union not unlike a fiaterna1 organization or club, possessing the power to 
make its own rules? 
The American jurists of the mid-twentieth century were faced with the 
daunting task of responding to arguments such as those set out above. 
American constitutional law had not yet developed to the point that it alone 
could be relied upon to combat the apparent racism of the unions. The 
principles of union democracy, majority nile, and the political clout of 
American white society found themselves before a Bench that seemed to 
have few tools with which to face the daunting challenge of fighting 
discrimination against black working men and ~ o m e n . ~  
' See, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co. 323 US. 192 (1944). 
&id. 
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In spite of the criticism that is ofien levelled at the courts and the 
justice system in generd, the development of the law in the field of union 
responsibility toward its membership is a credit to the creativity of the 
Bench. The courts in the United States of America enIisted some of the 
most versatile and useful tools of the Anglo-Amerïcan legai system as they 
struggled with the injustices occurring within the union ranks in post-war 
America. Tort concepts of neighbourliness , reasonableness , and faimess 
were employed in conjunction with the Iegal principles of agency, fiduciary 
duty, and contractual responsibility to craft remedies for apparent wrongs. 
In the early case of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.3 the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineermen had acquired 
bargaining rights pursuant to the Raiiway Labor ~ c f '  to represent d l  
firemen. Service as a fireman was a prerequisite to service as an engineer. 
While a significant number of firemen were black Arnericans, the majority 
were white. That majority had the right to select their bargaining agent. The 
majority selected the Brotherhood which permitted only white members. In 
spite of the fact blacks could not be members of the Brotherhood, the 
Supra, note 1. 
48 Stat. 1185; 45 U.S.C. ss 151 et. seq. 
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Brotherhood stiil had a responsibility to represent them. 
The white controlled Brotherhood wished to ensure biacks were not 
promoted to engineer positions. It set out to accomplish this by entering into 
agreements that limited the nurnber of black foremen in each senior@ 
dismct, controlling the seniority rights of blacks and restricting their 
employment opportunities . 
The petitioner Steele and fellow black employees filed a complaint in 
the Supreme Court of Alabama, claiming, among other relief, an injunction 
against the enforcernent of the agreements made between the railway 
companies and the Brotherhood. The Supreme Court of Alabama took the 
position the complaint stated no cause of action because the Railway &or 
A n  gave to the Brotherhood, the exclusive jurisdiction to represent 
employees in a craft. That exclusive jurisdiction could not be interfered with 
by the court. The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed. In 
rendering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Stone relied upon principles 
of duty emanating fiom the broad powers that had been given to the 
Brotherhood. He stated: 
"We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes 
upon the statutory representative of a craft at least 
as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests 
of the members of the craft as the Constitution 
imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection 
to the interests of those for whom it legislates. 
Congress has seen fit to clothe the Bargaining 
representative with power comparable to those 
possessed by a legislature body both to create and 
restrict the rights of those whom it represents, . . 
. but it has also imposed on the representative a 
corresponding duty . . . the duty to exercise fairly 
the power conferred upon it in behalf of al1 those 
for whom it acts without hostile discrimination 
against t h e d  
Frankly, the "corresponding duty" to which the Court referred was not 
imposed by Congress. It was created by the Courts to respond to the issue 
then before it. This corresponding duty constitutes a classic example of 
judicial lamaking through application of legal p ~ c i p l e s  founded in tort 
and agency. These legal concepts are clearly evident in the following excerpt 
"It is a principle of general application that the 
exercise of a granted power to act on behalf of 
others involves the assurnption toward them of a 
duty to exercise that power in their behalf! . . . It 
does require the union, in collective bargaining 
and in making contracts with the carrier, to 
represent non-union or minority union members of 
the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, 
impartially and in good faith" .6 
Supra, note 1 at 202, 203. 
Supra, note 1 at 2M.  204. 
9 
The union, having taken upon itself the role of agent for its members, had 
a duty act in their best interests? 
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howartf a white controlled 
union negotiated a contract which resulted in the loss of jobs by black 
porters because of their race. Howard was a member of a separate black 
union. He and other black men in his union were adversely affected by the 
majority union contract. Howard's cornplaint was that the defendant 
brotherhood discriminated against the black union. He sought an order 
declaring the contract nul1 and void. In rendering judgrnent in favour of 
Howard, the U .S. Supreme Court concluded the union must execute its msr 
"without lawless invasions of the rights of other workers" .9 
We see, then, that by 1952 the courts had employed the notion that 
trade unions owe a duty toward their members in order to provide a remedy 
in circumstances where none seemed availabie. However, other than by way 
' Simiiar approaches are evident in the judgments in Syres, et a i  v. Oil Workers 
Intedonal Union, et ai 323 F. 2d. 739 (5 C i . .  1955), 350 U.S. 892 (1955) and 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard 343 W. S .  768 ( 1952). 
Supra, note 7. 
Supra, note 7 at 774. 
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of dicta,1° the United States Supreme Court had not, by that tirne, applied 
that principle in any cases other than those involving dlegations of racial 
discrimination in the context of workers employed in the railway sector 
pursuant to the Railway Labour Act. 
It was not until the case of Ford Mutor Company v. Hu$7md1 that 
the Supreme Court considered a fair representation cornplaint whose ratio 
did not involve an allegation of racial discrimination. 
In Hz@mn, the Company and the union had agreed to a clause which 
gave seniority to renuning military servicemen upon completion of six 
month's service with the Ford Motor Company. Huffman complained that 
the union had violated its duty to fairly represent al1 employees because it 
had discriminated on the basis of pre-employment military service which 
was unrelated to job performance. He argued the only conditions upon 
which a union could discriminate were those related to seniority, 
performance, and other job related issues. The U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded the seniority credit negotiated for servicemen was within the 
bounds of relevancy. The Court acknowledged that the employer and the 
'O See, for example, Wallace Corporation v. National Labour Relations Board 323 
U.S. 248 (1944) and Commwzications Association v. Do& 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
" 356 U.S. 330 (1953). 
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union could make reasonabie distinctions without violating the duty of fair 
representation. Although the Court did not interpret the duty as broadly as 
Hufian had hoped, (he did not obtain the relief sought) its conclusions did 
extend the duty beyond one which limited itself to issues of racial 
discrimination. 
The Court concluded as follows: 
"The complete satisfaction of ail who are 
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide 
range of reasonableness must be allowed a 
statutory bargainhg representative in serving the 
unit it represents subject always to complete nood 
faith and honestv of purpose in the exercise of its 
discretion" . l2 (emphasis added) 
The corollary of the Supreme Court's opinion was that the exercise 
of discretion by a union that was not made in complete good faith and 
honesty of purpose was actionable. While lack of good faith and honesty 
was actionable, no positive standard that must be met by a union had yet 
been defined. 
Was this developing duty anything but an intentional tort? The cases 
seemed to be sending mixed messages. Consider the Steele case as an 
example. In that case, the predominantly white union sought a contract 
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excluding blacks from seMng as firemen. The petitioners sought to enjoin 
their union fiom negotiatiag such an agreement. The Court discussed the 
exercise of a granted power to act on behaif of others while at the same time 
exhorting the union to avoid hostile discrimination. A requiremeiit to 
exercise a granted power on behalf of others imposes a higher standard upon 
a trade union than the mere avoidance of hostile discrimination. 
The standard of care was m e r  refined in the two leading American 
cases of Huqhrey v. Moore13 and Vaca v. Sipes. I4 
In Hwnphrey v. Moore two companies merged. Their employees 
were represented by the same bargaining agent. An issue arose as to 
whether the seniority lists should be dovetailed or whether each unit should 
maintain its own k t .  After initially announcing it would take no position 
on the issue, the union changed its mind and recornrnended dovetailing to 
the joint labour-management cornmittee assigned the task of resolving the 
dispute. The plainUff, who was in the unit opposed to dovetailing, sued the 
union president alleging the order approving the dovetailing was arbitrary, 
capricious, and contrary to both the practice within the industry and the 
l3  375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
'* 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
collective agreement. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals found there was a breach of the duty 
to fairly represent al1 employees because the union sought to represent two 
sets of employees with antagonistic positions. The result in the Court of 
Appeai was the imposition of smct liability against any union who was 
called upon to represent employees with conflicting interests. In considering 
the practicalities of union management the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
such a proposition: 
"We are not ready to find a breach of the 
colIec tive bargaining agent' s duty of fair 
representation in taking a good faith position 
contrary to that of some individuals whom it 
represents nor in supporting the position of one 
group of employees against that of another ... 
because] conflict between employees represented 
by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove 
or gag the union in these cases would surely 
weaken the collective bargaining and grievance 
process " lS 
Unlike the facts in the racial discrimination cases, those in Vaca v. 
Sipes did not cry out for court intervention. The employee who made the 
allegation that his union had treated him unfairly had returned fiom sick 
lS Zbid. at 349-350. In al1 Canadian provinces and those areas governed by federal 
jurisdiction such issues of successorship and inter-mingling of employees are now the 
exclusive domain of the labour relations tribunais. 
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leave with a medical certificate stating that he was fit to return to work. 
The employer questioned the validity of the certificate and had the employee 
see the company doctor who concluded the employee should not return to 
work which required heavy lifting. The union processed the grievance to 
the fourth level and then had the employee examined by an independent 
physician at union expense. The independent physician agreed with the 
company doctor's opinion that the ernployee was not work-ready. The 
union dropped the grievance and suggested the employee accept the 
employer's offer of a referral to a rehabilitation centre. The employee 
brought action against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. 
He sought an order forcing the union to proceed with the grievance. The 
U.S. Supreme Court found in favour of the union. However, in the course 
of rendering judgrnent the court formulated the standard of care expected of 
a union in order to fulfil its duty of fair representation: 
"Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's 
statutory authority to represent al1 members of a 
designated unit includes a statutory obligation to 
serve the interests of d l  members without hostility 
or discrimination toward any, to exercise its 
discretion with complete good faith and honesty 
and to avoid arbitrary conduct. " l6 
I6 Note 9 at 358-360. 
While the standard applied in Vaca v. Sipes 
that of simply avoiding hostility, the formulation 
reference to arbitrary conduct, leaves some 
15 
imposes a higher one than 
of the test, because of its 
question about whether 
intentional conduct is required. The reference to "hostility or discrimination" 
indicates a clear requirement of some sort of guilv intent. The failure to 
act in good faith and with honesty contemplates proof that the union 
executive intentionally acted in bad faith and with dishonesty. Finally, from 
the cases discussed, infa, we will see the test for arbitrariness ranges from 
simple negligence to irrationality . The most commonly applied definition of 
arbitrariness is that it lacks a rational basis. Decisions have been held not to 
be arbitrary if they are based upon relevant, permissible factors. In any 
event, it is clear that discrimination and hostility required intentional conduct 
while arbitrary conduct required something more than mere or simple 
negligence. l7 
The onus upon a union member who considered himself or herself to 
have been mistreated by the union executive was heavy. The courts would 
l7 For an excellent analysis of the hostility, discrimination and arbitrariness test see, 
Neva S .  Flaherty, Detennining Standards for a Union's Dm of Fair Representdon: The 
Case for Ordinary Negligence (1980) 65 Corne11 Law Review 634 and cases cited 
therein. See aIso, Adams, Canadiim Lubour Law, 2nd Edition, Canada Law Book Inc: 
Aurora, 1998, page 13.1-13.10. 
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only intervene in cases of hostility or discrimination, lack of good faith and 
honesty or where the union member could prove the union had been 
arbitrary in its treament of him. 
We will see that since the early cases up to and including the present 
t h e  the American standard of proof for the arbitrary component of the test 
has, with varying interpretations, remained at one of irrationality. In fact, 
it could be said the standard a union must meet is lower today given some 
recent cases than it was in earlier stages of its development. 
The Canadian standard has, however, evolved significantly. It will be 
demonstrated that in those Provinces where the duty has not been codified 
there exists substantial jurkpmdence that the standard is one of simple 
negligence. These issues are more fully dealt with in Chapters II and III, 
infra. 
Tort Law Context 
It is surprising it took so long for the courts to develop a standard 
against which to measure the conduct of unions toward their members. Once 
a duty was recognized, courts still exhibited considerable restraint in 
imposing standards upon unions. Similar restraint was not exhibited in other 
17 
areas of human endeavour. 
It is important to juxtapose the development of the concept of the duty 
of fair representation with other major developments in the field of tort and 
contract Law. 
In 1932, at least 12 years before the U.S. Supreme Court judgments 
in Steele and Howard, Lord Atkin wrote his infamous judgment in 
Donoghue v. ~tevenson'~ wherein he concluded that persons within our 
reasonable contemplation are our neighbours. We owe them a duty to avoid 
foreseeable h m .  If the law of torts could be employed to provide a remedy 
to a consumer of soda in circurnstances where contract principles were of 
no avail, couid not this same concept of duty have been employed to found 
an action in negligence by a trade unionist toward his executive? Are not 
union members at least equally within the contemplation of members of the 
union executive as are soda pop drinkers within the contemplation of the 
bottler? 
Obviously , the principles flowing from Donoghue v . Stevenson did not 
lirnit themselves to soda pop drinkers. Before the decision in Vuca v. Sipes, 
l8 [1932] A.C. 562; [1932] AU E.R. 1. This test, has, of course been accepted and 
is well entrenched in Canadian law given such decisions as C .  of Komloops v. N i e h  
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; and J m  v. British Columbia [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228. 
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the courts had concluded that aggrieved parties to a contract were not 
lirnited to a contractual remedy,lg and that professionals were liable in 
contract as well as negligence.*O There were also claims that attorneys 
rnight be found liable in negligence as well as c ~ n t r a c t . ~ ~  
Perhaps the best example of the debate concerning the duty to take 
care is found in Palsgrafv. Long Island Rail& Co." a decision rendered 
long before Steele and Howard. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the major@ 
concluded every negligent act must be predicated upon a duty to someone. 
Andrews, J. in the dissent would have us separate concepts of duty from 
those of liability. He would have concluded that one owes a duty to the 
world at large to refrain from those acts that would threaten others. 
It is not my intention to repeat that debate. My purpose now is 
simply to suggest that union members are in a sufficiently proximate 
position to the executive that it should have them (the mernbers) within their 
reasonable contemplation when negotiating collective agreements or 
I9 Noaon v. Lord AsMurton, [1914] A.C. 932. 
20 Chandler V. Crane, Christmas & Co., [M 11 2 K. B. 164. 
21 See, Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence (1959). 12 Vand. L. Rev. 
755. 
(1928) 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.C.A.); 248 N.Y. 339 (C.A.). 
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proceeding with grievances. However, from the era of Vaca v. Sipes to the 
present day, courts and mbunais have struggied with the degree to which a 
union owes such a d ~ t y  to its mernbers. 
Uncertain of the extent to which negligence principles sbuld govem 
the relahonship between the union executive and the rnembership, the courts 
effectively created an intentional tort that has gradually given way to 
concepts of negligence. It is this evolution fkom the intentional tort to the 
tort of negligence that will be the focus of the next chapter. 
Fiduc* D.y 
Before tracing the evolution of the tort duty in matters of intra union 
disputes it is appropnate to comment upon the fiduciary relationship that 
exists between a union member and his or her executive. That relationship 
was an integral part of the development of the duty of fair representation in 
the United States. The relationship of dependence by the member upon his 
or her union was immunenta1 in the conclusion that a statutory obligation 
existed in Steele and Howard. The grant of power to the union required that 
it act in the interests of the member. 
It is also important to note that the remedy sought in Steele and 
20 
Howard was not one of general darnages. The petitioners sought to have the 
offending contract language removed. Their demand was for a remedy that 
historically would have been available in Courts of equity. A fiduciary 
relationship is distinguished frorn a relationship in which ordinary negligence 
arises by reason of the presence of loyalty, trust and confidence? 
This fiduciary analogy is weil afticuiated in Cha@eurs, Teamsters and 
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry et al.24 Terry brought action against his 
employer for violation of the collective agreement and joined his union as 
a Party, aileging breach of its duty of fair representation contrary to section 
301 of the Laoour Management Relations ACL" The issue before the 
Supreme Court of the United States was whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to a jury trial. If the action was strictly equitable then no jury need be 
summoned. If the action was legal, or part legal and part equitable then the 
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial. The union, not wanting a jury trial, 
argued the relationship between it and its member was comparable to a trust. 
While the Court concluded an action for breach of the duty of fair 
Lloyd's Bank Lrd. v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326; cited with approval in Norberg v. 
U5mib, [i992] 2 S.C.R. 226. 
24 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
25 61 Stat. 156; 29 U.S.C. s.185 (1982 ed.). A union may only be liable to its 
member if the plaintiff is able to prove a violation of the collective agreement. 
representation was part equitable and part legal the following excerpt 
demonstrates the role trust considerations have played and continue to play 
in the development of that duty: 
" Just as a tmstee must act in the best interest of 
the beneficiaries, 2 A W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts 
f 170 (4th id. l987), a union, as the exclusive 
representative of the workers, must exercise its 
power to act on behaif of the employees in good 
faith, Vnca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177. Moreover, 
just as a beneficiary does not directly control the 
actions of a tnistee, 3 Fratcher, supra, f 187, 
individual employee lacks direct control over a 
union's actions taken on his behalf, see Cox, the 
Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 21 (1958). 
The trust analogy extends to a union's handling of 
g-rievances. In most cases, a tnistee has the 
exclusive authoriv to sue third parties who injure 
the beneficiaries' interest in the trust . . . The 
tnistee then has the sole responsibility for 
determinhg whether to settle, arbitrate or 
otherwise dispose of the claim. Similarly, the 
union typically has broad discretion in its decision 
whether and how to pursue an employee's 
grievance . . . . 26 
That fairly recent statement of the American jurisprudence is consistent with 
the earlier statements of the law. In Steele the development of the duty of 
fair representation was grounded on the basis that a union has a granted 
Supra, note 24 at 567, 568. 
power to act on behalf of others and this power involves the assumption that 
that power will be exercised in the interest and benefit of the union member. 
In Howard the Court referred to the trust relationship existing between the 
union and its members. In Buzartez v. United Transportation uniod7 the 
duty of fair representation was described as a fiduciary one.2s In I.B.E. W., 
Local 801 v. N . L . R . B . ~ ~  the duty of a union toward its members was 
described as a special obligation. 
In Canada we have seen significant developments in the field of 
fiduciary responsibility in recent years. While those developments are useful 
for purposes of understanding the origins of the duty of fair representation, 
Canadian courts have not yet had the occasion to fully integrate them into 
the jurisprudence relating to the duty of fair representation. 
In Canadian jurisprudence a fiduciary relationship is said to exist 
where : 
(a) one party agrees to act on behalf of or in the best interests of, 
another person; 
- 
" 429 F. 2d. 868, 871 (3d Cu. 1970). 
L8 See also, ntompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Cor Porters 3 16 F .  2d. 2 10 (4th 
Cir. 1963). 
29 307 F. 2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
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(b) that party is in a position to affect the interests of another 
person in a legal and practical way; and 
(c) that party (fiduciary) is able to use the discretion given to hirn 
or her to the detriment of the benefi~iary.~~ 
Based upon the test set out above, a union member is without doubt 
the beneficiary of a fiduciary reiationship with the union executive who has 
charge over the grievance process and the negotiation of benefits on his or 
her behalf. 
The union, upon obtaining voluntary recognition or certification 
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for the employee vis-a-vis the 
employment relationship. The union mernber thereby loses al1 rights to 
negotiate tems of his or her employment contract. In deaiing with 
employers, the union effectively becomes the agent for the union member. 
Recent judgments fiom the Canadian courts in matters unrelated to 
trade union affairs assist in an assessment of how the courts will deal with 
this relationship between tort and fiduciary obligation that flows from the 
employee-union relationship. 
In Bluebers, River IIldian Band v. Canada (Minister of lndian Affairs 
30 See, Frame v. Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 at 88, 89 (S.C.C.). 
and Norrhern Development) l 
mineral rights to the Crown in 
24 
the Indian Beaver Band had surrendered 
trust "to lease" for its beneflt, In 1945 the 
Band surrendered the reserve to the Crown to "se11 or lease" . The federal 
Crown eventually sold the lands to the Department of Veteran's Affairs, 
who in tum sold it to returning veterans. Oil and gas were discovered on the 
lands Ui 1976. The Band then brought action against the federal govemment 
claiming damages by reason of the improvident sale in 1945 and transfer of 
mineral rights in 1940. The daim was dismissed at the trial division and in 
the Federal Court of Appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the majority acknowledged by taking on a trustee position in relation to the 
mineral rights in 1940 the Crown had a duty to deal with the land in the best 
interests of the Band mernbers. While the Court concluded the trust in 
surrendered Indian lands couid not be equated with a cornmon law trust, it 
did conclude that trust like obligations and p ~ c i p l e s  were relevant.32 
We have already seen a reference to special obligation33 to describe 
the fiduciary nature of a union toward its members. Similar words were 
31 (1993) 151 N.R. 241 (Fed. C.A.); overtumed on [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344. 
32 ibid at 358 (S.C.R.). 
" Supra, note 29. 
employed by Justice McLachlin in Laura Norberg v. Morris wnrib, et 
a case where a patient s u d  her physician in tort (assault) and for 
breach of fiduciary duty. McLachlin, J. concluded that the physician patient 
relationship "falls into that special category of relationships which the law 
calls fiduciary . " 35 
It is this special obligation or special relationship that is the 
underpinning of a finding of a fiduciary du@. It arises in any circumstance 
where one person or entity assumes the power that would normaily reside 
with the other per~on.'~ 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of a finding that a fiduciary duty 
has been breached as opposed to a tort duty is in the approach to damages. 
We are familiar with the requirement that damages must be foreseeable. No 
such requirement exists where the breach is of a fiduciary duty. This 
distinction was aptly stated by McLachlin, J. in Carnon Enterprises Ltd. v. 
" [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226. 
35 Ibid at page 289. In her judgment, McLachlin J.also cited with approvai the earlier 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in F m e  v. Smith, supra and Gwrh v. The 
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
36 See, Canadian Aero Service v. O'Malley, [1974] S .C. R. 592; Lac Minerals Ltd. 
v. Internat~~onal &rom, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; Guen'n v. The Queen, 119841 2 S.C.R. 
834; W(B) v. Mellor, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1393 (S.C.); Canson Enteprises v. Boughton 
& Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534. 
Boughton & Co. 
"In negligence we wish to protect reasonable 
freedom of action of the defendant, and the 
reasonableness of his or her action rnay be judged 
by what consequences can be foreseen. In the case 
of breach of fiduciary duty , as in deceit, we do not 
have to look to the consequences to judge the 
reasonableness of the actions. A breach of 
fiduciary duty is wrong in itself regardes of 
whether a loss can be f~reseen."~' 
The discussion of tort duty, infra rnust be considered with the 
knowledge that a special relationship exists between a union and its members 
and that special relationship requires it act as it would prudently act in 
relation to its own affairs. Depending upon the facts of the case and the 
degree of negligence a mal judge considers appropriate, a fiduciary test 
might well be the most advantageous for an aggrieved union member to 
advance. 
The current state of the law was appropria te!^ summed up by 
McLachlin, J. in M(V) v. M(H) and Women 's Legai Educution and Action 
". . . a breach of fiduciary duty cannot be 
automaticaiîy overlooked in favour of concurrent 
37 Supra, note 36 at 553. 
38 (1992), 14 C.C.L.T. 1 (S.C.C.). 
common law claims . . . for those duties, now that 
cornmon Iaw and equity are mingled the courts 
have available the full range of remedies, including 
damages or compensation and restitutionary 
remedies . . . 't 39 
Two excellent examples of the courts using equitable remedies to right 
wrongs in alleged cases of unfair representation are to be found in Pamch 
v. Nova Scotia Nurses' Uniona and Donovan v. City of Saint In 
Panrch the union refused to proceed with the grievance. In Donovan the 
union and employer settled a grievance that favoured another employee to 
the detriment of Donovan. The trial divisions in both Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick determined the employees would be without a remedy but for 
court intervention. In Paruch the union was ordered to proceed with the 
grievance. In Donovan the Court, relying upon the Municipaliries A C F ~  
struck dom the setuement of a grievance that had been negotiated by City 
Council and the union in circumstances clearly prejudicial and 
discriminatory toward the applicant. 
Any application of the tort standard discussed infia should always be 
39 Ibid at 40. 
" (1991), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 101 (N.S.S.C.)(T.D.). 
41 (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 110 (N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.). 
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22 as amendeci. 
measured against the backdrop of fiduciary responsibility. The extent to 
which intention to deceive or to be dishonest is necessary in proof of breach 
of fiduciary duty is debatable given the approach of the Supreme Court in 
Blueberry River Indian Band. In that case there was no intention to deceive 
or to be dishonest (a low standard to meet). There was however, a failure 
to act in the best interests of the Band (a high standard to meet, even higher 
than a negligence standard). 
Given the approach in Blueberry River Indian Band the court may be 
retreating fiom the admonition articulated in Girardet v. Crease & C d 3  
where Southin J. stated: 
"the adjective ' fiduciary ' rneans of or pertaining to 
a trustee or trusteeship. That a lawyer can commit 
a breach of the special duty of a tnistee, eg. by 
stealing his client's money, by entering into a 
contract with the client without full disclosure, by 
sending a client a bill claiming disbursements 
never made and so forth are clear. But to Say that 
simple carelessness in giving advice is such a 
breach is a perversion of words ... 1 make this 
point because an allegation of breach of fiduciary 
duty cames with it the stench of dishonesty - if not 
of deceit then of constructive fkaud." 
Regardless, in matters involvhg intra-union conflict, the prudent practitioner 
- 
43 (1987), 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 361 at 362; cited with approval in Lac Minerals Ltd. 
v. Intemahb~l  Corona Resources (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14 at 28 (S.C.C.); see also, 
Hodgkimon v. Sim (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). 
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will frame the clah based upon contract, tort and fiduciary p~c ip les .  
Although the expression of these principles will no doubt be 
compartmentalized for purposes of pleading, it is important to note that 
overlays of d l  three are present as courts define the duty of fair 
representation and develop the standard by which it is measured. 
CHAPTER II 
Defining the Duty and Developing the Standard 
17re Canadian Standard 
Canadian law with respect to the duty of fair representation has been 
influenced in two very significant ways. FirstIy , the American development 
of the duty was transplanted onto Canadian soil. Secondly, most Canadian 
jurisdictions, including the federal goveniment, quickiy codified the duty 
thereby limiting its evolution and tefinement by the courts. Courts in the 
Maritime Provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward 
Island are therefore responsible for most of the latest judicial developments 
in the duty of fair representation as there has been no attempt at codification 
in those jurisdictions. 
The British Columbia case of Fisher v. Pembenone> is singularly 
responsible for transplanting American jurisprudence in relation to the duty 
of fair representation to Canadia. soil. In considering the duty owed to 
Fisher by his union executive, MacDonald, J. concluded as follows: 
"That duty (duty of fair representation) is not 
spelled out in any Canadian decisions of which 1 
(1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 521 (B.C.S.C.). 
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am aware, but there are decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States which are in point. 
They define the duty with which 1 am concemeci in 
a way which, with respect, appeals to me as sound 
and 1 therefore apply them in this case."45 
The facts in Fisher v. Pelttberton constitute a classic example of one 
made union fighting with another for the hearts and minds of the members 
of the bargaining unit - a take-over bid by a rival union. Mr. Fisher 
happened to be on the losing side. In fact, he had been the president of the 
iocal union displaced by that supported by Pemberton. When it came t h e  
for the union to file a grievance on behaif of Mr. Fisher it was clear he had 
little support fiom the incumbent union. In fact, there was clearly animosity 
on the part of the union toward Mr. Fisher and a willingness to see him 
disrnissed. Considering this history of hostiiity and the perfunctory rnanner 
in which the union chose not to proceed with Mr. Fisher's grievance, the 
court concluded he had been dealt with arbitrarily. Rather than order the 
union to proceed with arbitration, the Court considered the merits of the 
grievance and awarded only nominal damages having concluded that the case 
was without ment. 
Aithough MacDonald, J. accepted the notion of a union duty to fairly 
represent its members and stated he iound the Amencan cases appealing to 
him, he does not attempt to define the standard in his own terms, nor does 
he describe why he finds the American cases appeahg. In fact, afier 
concluding the duty of fair representation exists in Canada, and, afeer citing 
the relevant American jurisprudence his Lordship concluded the decision to 
abandon the grievance was not made in a "non-arbitrary" manner. The 
Court did not attempt to define arbitrary. 
The blanket acceptance of the early American jurisprudence has 
experienced legislative and judicial modifications in the past number of 
years. Every province except New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince 
Edward Island has codified the duty or some aspect of it in their relevant 
labour relations s t a t ~ t e . ~  Furthemore, the govemment of Canada has 
iocluded the duty in the Canadcz Labour Codem4' 
The Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to defîne the duty in 
- -- 
" Labour Relations Code S.A. 1988 c .  L-1.2 as amendeci, S. 151 
Labour Relations Code S. B. C . 1992 c. 82 as amended, S. 12 
The Lubour Relarions Act R.S.M. 1987 c. L-IO, S. 20 
Labour Relations Act 1995 S.S. 1995, S. 74 
Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-27 as amended, S. 47.2 
Labour Relations Act R 5 N . B  1990 c. L-1, S. 130 
The Trade Union Act R.S.S. 1978 c- T-17 as amended, S. 25.1 
These statutory provisions are fully set out in Schedule A, appended hereto. 
" R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. See, Schedule A. 
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Canadian terms in Canadian Merchant Service Guild v. Gagnon," Supply 
and Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of Cana& and Gendron 
and the Public Service Alliance of (Ânada, Local 500.57," and Centre 
Hospitalier Regina Ltee. v. Prud 'h~mme.~~  
In Gagnon, the grïevor had been hired by the employer as a pilot boat 
captain. He was transferred to the position of maintenance worker. He 
considered the transfer to be a dismissal. A grievance was filed and taken 
through the first three levels of the grievance process. However, the union 
refused to take the grievance to arbitration. Eight months afier being 
transferred to the position of maintenance worker, the grievor was 
dismissed. 
He did not seek to grieve his dismissal from the position of 
maintenance worker. However, several months after his termination, he 
brought an action in the Quebec Superior Court alleging wrongfil dismissal 
by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union, 
both alleged violations of obligations owed pursuant to article 1056 of the 
Quebec Civil Code. In both the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 509; (1984). 9 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.). 
49 (1990), 109 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.); [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298. 
(1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (S.C.C.); [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1330. 
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Court of Appeal," the Courts concluded the union had breached its duty 
of fair representation. 
In the Quebec Court of Appeal, L'Heureux-Dubé, J. (as she then was) 
concluded that Gagnon's transfer was actuaily a disguised dismissal. She 
aiso concluded that considering Gagnon's insistence that the maner be taken 
to arbitration and aii the facts given to the union by him, the union had 
failed to carry out a sufficiently indepth investigation. L'Heureux-Dubé, J. 
concluded the union's conduct was "arbitrary and wrongful"" in that it was 
taken negligently without thorough investigation. This is the first statement 
from a Corn of Appeal that "negligent conduct" could rneet the test of 
arbitrariness . Interestingly , she also concluded that " negligence and 
incornpetence " constituted " bad faith" . 53 
Those conclusions in the Quebec Court of Appeal would have made 
unions liable for negligent conduct, a significant step in the development of 
the law when compared to the relatively low standard emanating fiorn Fisher 
v. Pembenon. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected that approach. It 
51 Canadian Merchant *ce Guldetalv. Gagnon, [1981] C.A. 431; overturned, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 509. 
5Z Note 51 at 529 (S.C.R.). 
53 Note 51 at 530 (S.C.R.). 
concluded that failure to 
could not constitute bad 
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undertake a substantive or thorough investigation 
faith. It fomuiated the common Iaw duty of fair 
representation in the following manner: 
"The following principles, concemhg a union's duty of fair 
representation in respect of a grievance, emerge from the case- 
law and academic opinion consulted: 
1. the exclusive power conferred on a union to 
act as a spokesman for the employees in a 
bargainhg unit entails a corresponding obligation 
on the union to fairly represent al1 employees 
comprised in the unit; 
2. when, as is hue here and is generally the 
case, the right to take a grievance to arbitration is 
resewed to the union, the employee does not have 
an absolute right to arbitration and the union 
enjoys considerable discretion; 
3. this discretion must be exercised in good 
faith, objectively and honestly, after a thorough 
smdy of the grievance and the case, taking into 
account the significance of the grievance and of its 
consequences for the employee of one hand and 
the legitimate interests of the union on the other; 
4. the union's decision must not be arbitrary, 
capricious , discriminatory or wrongful ; 
5 .  the representation by the union must be fair, 
genuine and not merely apparent, undertaken with 
integrity and cornpetence, without senous or major 
negligence, and without hostility towards the 
36 
employee. "" 
It is apparent that the tests of arbitrariness, discrimination and hostility 
of the early Amencan jurisprudence have suMved and been aansposed into 
the Canadian version of the duty of fair representation. In those cases 
where the Canadian courts conclude there is intentional conduct of the part 
of the union executive, virtually any fact situation can result in an award of 
darnages should the union be found to be blameworthy. More problematic, 
however, is measuring the degree of serious or major negligence required 
to found liability. 
It is significant though that Gagnon introduced negligence as part of 
the test for determining whether or not the union has met its duty, provided 
however, that that negligence is "serious or major". 
(i) Effect of Codijication on the Cornmon Law: Ouster of the 
Courts 
In Gagnon, this definition of the duty of fair representation constituted 
judicial lawmaking consistent with our common law traditions5 given that 
Y Note 51 at 527 (S.C.R.). 
55 A review of the article by H. Patrick Glenn, The & m n  h w  in (1995) 
74 C.B.R. 261 demonstrates just how clearly the development of the duty of fair 
representation is a common law development. The author suggests that the common Iaw 
is a method of legal thought built upon the foudation of a free people asking the nght 
the duty had not yet been codified in the Canada Labour Code, the 
applicable legislation governing the plaintiff s ~o rkp lace .~~  
In Gendron, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the codification 
of the duty of fair representation as defuied by the Canada Laoour Code. 
The plaintiff, an employee of the Goverment of Canada mint, was the 
successfùl applicant for a vacancy. The three unsuccessful candidates 
grieved. The union conducted an investigation and concluded the employer 
had not applied its own standards established for assessing the candidates. 
Once those standards were applied, the plaintiff (grievor) was removed from 
the position. He then grieved the failure by the employer to award him the 
position. 
The union supported the Mevance at the first two stages of the 
grievance procedure but refised to submit it to arbitration. The plaintiff 
(Gendron) then brought action against his union in the Manitoba Court of 
questions in an environment of diverse legal traditions. If enough of us ask the right 
questions then we just might solve the problem. That is precisely the method by which 
the concept of a union's duty to its members has developed and continues to develop. 
Perhaps the common law is best defmed as a system of law that refuses to be static. One 
whose definition is totally encompasseci by its evolutionary character. 
56 Statutorily based duties are a common feature of modem negligence law and 
considered part of our common law development. Numerous examples of statute based 
duties are to be found in Linden, C a d i a n  Tort Law Butterworths, 6th Edition, Toronto: 
1987. 
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Queen's Bench. He alleged the union breached the duty of fair 
representation owed to him. 
The issue in the case was whether the plaintiff could even bring an 
action before the courts given that the duty of fair representation was 
codified by operation of the Cana& Labour Code. Did that codification oust 
the jurisdiction of the Court or did it place it exclusively in the hands of the 
Canada Labour Relations Board? In responding to that question, L7Heureux- 
Dubé, J., now writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, found it necessary 
to: 
(a) examine the duty at common law; and 
(b) examine the Code in order to determine whether it contemplates 
any role for the ordinary courts in relation to union conduct (or 
misconduct) . 
L'Heureux-Dubé, J. considered the Canadian and American cases in 
some detail as she established the foundation for the common law duty of 
fair representation. At page 13 15 (S. C . R.) she concludes: 
"It is clear then that Canadian Courts have 
followed the lead of their counterparts in the 
United States in inferring fiom the statutory gram 
of exclusive bargainhg authority a correspondhg 
duty of fair representation." 
39 
Before proceeding to the second phase of her analysis, that is, whether 
or not the codification ousted the common law, L'Heureux-Dubé, J. did not 
make any serious effort to define this common law duty, nor did she attempt 
to compare the duty at common law to the codification. One would have 
expected such an analysis essential before pronouncing upon the issue of 
jurisdiction. Obviously, if the duties were different, one from the other, 
would the argument that the common law courts were ousted not be 
weakened? Similarly, a conclusion at the first stage that the tests were 
identicai would no doubt strengthen the argument that the court's role had 
been ousted. In fact, at page 13 16 Justice L'Heureux-Dubé concluded the 
jurisdiction of the Courts is ousted even before she concluded that the 
content of S. 136.1 (now S. 37) of the C Q ~  Laoour Code is identical to 
the "duty at comrnon law. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé then arrives at another questionable 
conclusion. She concludes the common Iaw duty is not in any sense additive 
(to the codification) but merely duplicative. With respect, I fail to 
understand how the common law duv could be duplicative given her 
extensive analysis demonstra~g how that duty had developed from the 
Note 49 at 1316 (S.C.R.). 
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American cases and how it had developed in Canada quite in advance of any 
codification. By her own anaiysis, the codification was duplicative of the 
common 1aw and not the reverse. 
It is Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's analysis that the common law is 
duplicative of the codification and not the reverse that appears to be the 
basis for her conclusion that the common law duty is ousted by the Gad 
Labour Code. Had she concluded that the Code duplicates or at least 
attempts to duplicate the common law duty, she may well have required 
greater proof of Parliament's intention to oust the common law jurisdiction 
of the Courts. 
With respect, it is submitted the Court abandoned its jurisdiction in 
Gendron without clear evidence of Parliamentary intention. Although the 
Court concluded the comrnon law duty and the statutory duty of fair 
representation are the same, it is submitted there are sufficient differences 
in procedure and remedies, that, had those differences been fully examined 
the Court may not have concluded its jurisdiction had been ousted. Consider 
the following : 
(a) at common law, a c l a h  for solicitor-client costs can be made; 
no such right exists pursuant to the Code; 
at common law, a claim for aggravated or exemplary damages 
can be made; such a clairn is not available pursuant to the 
Code; 
at common law, the grounds of appeal or review are broader 
than is the case with codification under the Code, where a very 
restrictive privative clause exists;" 
finally, even in her own analysis, L'Heureux-Dubé concluded: 
"Recent amenciments to the Canada 
Labour Code rnay restrict the 
statutory duty ... thereby arguably 
leaving some room for the comrnon 
law duty to operate at the collective 
bargaining stage. 
Given that the common law duty embraced both contract negotiation and 
contract administration by the time Gendron was decided, it seems quite 
contradictory to acknowledge a possible difference and yet conclude that the 
comrnon law duty is identical to the codification. Either they are the same, 
or they are not. In this case, even by the Courts own admission, the duties 
are not "obviously identical" as previously stated by ber? It is the 
Note 47, S. 122. 
s9 Note 49 at 1320 (S.C.R.). 
* Note 49 at 1316 (S.C.R.). 
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conclusion that the codification is identical to the common law that has 
caused serious error in the development of the Iaw as it relates to whether 
or not the courts' jurisdiction is ousted. Unlike the United States al1 
Provinces do not assess the issue of whether the courts are ousted based 
upon the federal  la^.^' 
With respect, the erroneous analysis in Gendron does not end with 
claims that the statutory duty and the common law duty are identical and the 
conclusion that damages constitute the only available remedy in the courts. 
With equal zeal, her Ladyship accepts the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Sr. Anne Nackawic Pulp di Paper Co. v. Canadian Papeworkers' 
Union62 as one of the determining factors in her analysis that the common 
law jurisdiction is ousted by the codification. Although addressed in more 
detail later in this paper, the decision in St. Anne Nackawic that the Courts 
had no jurisdiction to deal with a dispute between the employer and the 
union was premised almost exclusively on the fact that the Legislature had 
ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts in very clear language in section 55 of 
61 N a t i o ~ l  Labour Relations A n  49 Stat. 449, as amended; 29 U. S. C. S. 15 1 et seq. 
(1982 ed & Supp. m); and L&our Mamgement Relations Act, I947 61 Stat. 156; s.301 
29 U.S.C. S. 185(a). 
" [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704. 
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the New Brunswick Industriai Relations ACT." All disputes between the 
parties (employer/union) were to be resolved by Final and binding 
arbitration. Such clear words directing unions and its members to settle 
their differences (intra-union conflict) by some mechanism outside of the 
Courts (apparently ousting the jurïsdiction of the courts) are not to be found 
in the Canada L,ubour Code. Regardless, the direction from the Supreme 
Court is that the statutory duty of fair representation in Gendron is identical 
to the cornmon law duty describecl in Gagnon? 
Finally, in considering those cases interpreting the duty of fair 
representation that have been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
L'Heureux-Dubé, J., in Centre Hospitalier Regina Ltee v . P d  'homme, 
supra, describes a two stage procedure to be applied for purposes of 
determinhg whether a union has met its duty in this regard: 
"First, the union must carefully consider the merits 
of the grievance to decide whether it should be 
taken to arbitration . . . at the second stage, if the 
union decides that the grievance has merit, it must 
represent the employee without serious negligence, 
discrimination or bad faith at al1 subsequent stages 
of the grievance procedure. 
R.S.N.B. 1973. C. 1-4, as amendeci. 
60 Note 49 at 340-341 (D.L.R.). 
" Note 50 at 622 (D.L.R.). 
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What constitutes serious or major negligence for purposes of meeting 
the standards irnposed by ths duty? Unfortunately, alrhough the Supreme 
Court has had several occasions to define serious or major negligence in 
tems of a union's duty toward its members, there has been virtually no 
guidance from that Court in this regard except on a case-by-case basis. 
No doubt, the degree of negligence most akin to "serious or major" 
negligence is that of gross negligence. As will be seen, infra, the distinction 
between it and ordinary negligence has been considered on numerous 
occasions by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
(ü) Gross or Serious Negligence 
Perhaps one of the best indicia of what is not considered major or 
serious negligence is found in the decision of the Canada Labour Relations 
Board in Brenda Haley and Canadian Airline Employees' Association and 
Eastern Provincial Aimays (1963) LNnited.66 The Board was called upon 
to interpret section 136.1 of the Canada M o u r  Code, the same section 
considered by the Suprerne Court in Gendron. 
In that case, the employee, Brenda Haley, was dismissed for excessive 
66 [1980] 3 C.L.R.B.R. 501; (1980) 81 C.L.L.C. 16070. 
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absenteeism. She had been active in the union and, until a short period of 
tirne prior to her dismissal, appeared to have been a good employee. After 
receiving her dismissal notice she sought the advice of her union and filed 
a grievance. Not having received a response to the grievance within the 
time period set out in the collective agreement, the matter was referred to 
arbitration. At the arbitration hearing the employer objected to the 
arbitrability of the grievance because of a missed time limit on the part of 
the union. There was no lack of good faith on the part of the union. There 
was no arbitrary conduct, nor was there any hostile discrimination. The 
missed thne lirnit was, according to the majority, the result of improperly 
counting the days within which action had to be taken, an innocent error. 
The grievance would not proceed. This was clearly a case where substantid 
damage had k e n  caused to the grievor by reason of mere negligence. 
The Board acknowledged that 'serious negligence' or 'gross 
negligence' on the part of the union would constitute a failure on its part to 
meet the requirements of the duty of f ~ r  representation. It also 
acknowledged that this pafticular grievance represented the most serious 
kind one could file. It affected the critical job interest of continued 
employment of the grievor. In spite of the fact that a mitical job interest was 
at stake, and in spite of the fact the union miscounted, the majority 
concluded there was no breach of the duty and the grievor was without a 
remedy . 
Even in his dissent in Haley, board member Jamieson, was unwilling 
to conclude that a union could be liable for breach of the duty of fair 
representation based upon or- or simple negligence. In his attempt to 
fit the facts of Haley into the established jurisprudence of the Board, which 
required prouf of more than mere negligence before a union could be liable, 
he concluded: 
".. . once a decision is taken to proceed to 
arbitration, it can be assumed that a trade union is 
fully aware of the gravi@ of the situation. it must 
be expected to act accordingly and be accountable 
in its duty to represent fairly. It is a gross 
understatement to characterize a missed tirne limit 
at this crucial stage as an 'innocent mistake'. A 
missed time limit during the processing of a 
grievance involving for example, a dispute over 
two hours overtime wages could be called simple 
negligence and should not be viewed in the same 
light as a rnissed time limit in a discharge 
grievance. The gravity of the issue must raise the 
quality of representation expected by an 
employee. "67 
Supra. note 66 at page 511 (C.L.R.B.R.). The American courts have not been 
quite so kind with respect to misseci limitation dates, see for example, R ~ c h  v. General 
Motors Corporation 523 F .  2d. 306 (6th C K .  . 1975) Dutrisac v. Chterpillar Tractor Co. 
749 F.2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1982) and Vencl. v.  InternahioMI Union of ûperating Engineers 
The Haley case is but one example of the difficulty labour boards and 
the courts have in determining what is serious or major negligence and what 
is not. Given that the courts who have considered the duty of fair 
representation have not attempted to define serious or gross negligence and 
have provided M e  by way of analysis that would pennit one to assess 
whether a union's conduct is or is not grossly negligent, it is necessary to 
consider other examples in tort where gross negligence is or has been the 
standard. A consideration of those cases will give some benchmarks by 
which to assess whether or not a union has met the standard required of it. 
Gross negligence has been considered by Our courts in numerous 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, those situations where the 
v i c b  of an automobile accident was a gratuitous pa~senger,~~ the person 
responsible for the safekeeping of goods was a gratuitous bai~ee,~' and 
where an injured plaintiff could not recover against a municipal government 
137 F. 3d. 420 (6th Cir. 1998) where unions were held liable for missing limitation dates. 
The courts considered such conduct to be 'arbitrary' within the definition of d a i r  
representation. 
" See, for example, McCulloch v. Murray, [1942] S .C. R. 141; Thompson v. Fraser, 
[1955] S.C.R. 419; Studer v. Cooger, [1951] S.C.R. 450; Burke v. Peny and Perry, 
119631 S.C.R. 379; Waiker v. Cornes, [1968] S.C.R. 599; Jackron v. Milhr, [1976] 1 
S.C.R. 225; Gouiais v. Resoule m e ,  [1975] 1 S.C.R. 365. 
69 COggs v. Bernard (l703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909; (1702). 92 E.R. 107; Fairley & 
Stevens (1966) Ltd. v. Goldrwonhy (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 554 (NSSC) (T.D.) 1; 
Campbell v. Pickard ( M l ) ,  30 D.L.R. (2d) 152 (Man. C.A.). 
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unless the municipal authority was gurlty of gross negligence.'O 
In addition, contracts have k e n  drafied so as to preclude liability 
unless the offending party is guilty of gross negligen~e.~' 
In McCulloch v. Murrayn Sir Lyman Duff, C.J.C., as he then was, 
defined gross negligence in the following terms: 
" Al1 these phrases, gross negligence, wilful 
rnisconduct , wanton misconduct, irnply conduct in 
which, if there is not conscious wrongdoing, there 
is a very marked departure fkom the standards by 
which responsible and competent people in charge 
of motor cars habitually govern themselves. "73 
In Studer v. Cowper74 Kerwin, J. defined gross negligence as very 
great negligence. The court in Sruder v. Cowper reaffirmed that the issue of 
whether any given circumstance constitues gross negligence is a question 
to be decided by the trier of facts. 
The deference c o r n  of appeal should demonstrate toward trial judges' 
conclusions in this regard was well stated by the Court in Burke v. Perry 
'O See, for example, Hollnnd v. City of Toronto, 11927 S.C.R. 242; Harper v. 
Prescott, [194û] S.C.R. 688. 
'' Ca& v. Canada Steamhip Lines Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 532. 
Supra, note 68. 
73 Bid at 145 in McCulloch v. Mumay. 
74 Supra, note 68. 
and Perry .75 
a set of facts 
49 
Ritchie, J. (as he then was) held that the characterization of 
as gross negligence: 
". . . involves a reconstruction of the 
circumstances of the accident itself including the 
reactions of persons involved and îhis is a function 
for which the mal iudge who has seen and heard 
the witnesses is far better equip~ed than are the 
judges of an a~pellate court.76 
The admonition by Ritchie, J .  in Burke v. Perry and Perry that the 
mal judge is best suited to make a determination of whether the facts of a 
particular case constitue gross negligence appear not to have been heeded 
by him in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Goulais v. Restoule 
Estare? In that case, Godais was the only survivor of a tragic accident in 
which Mrs. Restoule had apparently crossed the centre line of the roadway 
and collided with oncoming trafic. 
In Goulais, both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal 
concluded Mrs. Restoule was not guilty of gross negligence. Part of the 
evidence at mal included a statement from the plaintiff taken approximately 
75 Supra, note 68. 
'' &id, at 33 1-332. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistentiy applied this nile. 
See, for example, Stein v. The Ship Kmhy K, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802; R. v. Von der Peet, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507: Dickuson v. Universi9 of Aloe~a ,  [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103. 
77 LI9751 1 S.C.R. 365. Here the Court applied the test set out in McCulloch v. 
Murray, supra, at note 68. 
two months p s t  accident in which he said, inter dia, 
"It appeared to me as if this vehicle was coming 
towards our side of the road . . . I feel strongly 
Marilyn (Mrs. Restoule) is not to blame for this 
accident. " 78 
In concluding the respondent was grossly negligent Ritchie, J. 
speaking for the majority concluded the facts disclosed in the evidence 
required some explanation, which was not forthcoming. He opined as 
follows: 
"In the present case there is no suggestion of 
conscious wrongdoing on the part of Mrs. 
Restoule, but with the greatest respect for the 
judgments at trial and in the Court of Appeal, it is 
my view that a driver who allows her car to 
"slowly swewe" into the middle of the left hand 
aaffic lane in the face of the approaching lights of 
another car is guilty of a "very marked departure 
from the standards by which responsible and 
competent people in charge of motor cars 
habitually govem themselves" , and having reached 
this conclusion, 1 am satisfied that the 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this 
case were such as to require an explanation 
consistent with lack of gross negligence. (See 
Walker v. Cmes)  .79 No satisfactory explanation 
is suggested by the appellant who was the only 
survivor of the accident. 1 appreciate that this 
Ibid at page 371-372. Dickson, J. in dissent, would not have disturbed the 
findings of the lower courts. 
79 In Walker v. Cimes, 119681 S. C.R. 599 the court concluded the principle of res 
ipsa luquitor couid be used to conclude conduct was grossly negligent. 
conclusion m s  contrary to the findings of both 
courts below. . . w 80 
Res ipsa luquitor came in aid of an injured plaintiff to prove gross 
negligence. 
In the bailment cases of Campbell v. Picar&' and Fairley & Stevens 
(1966) Ltd. v. ~oldswonhy~~ both the Manitoba Court of Appeal and Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court, Triai Division, respectively, adopted the test of gross 
negligence as set out in McCulloch v. Murray, namely, the marked 
departure test. 
In Harper v. Town of ~rescon8~ the plaintiff had been injured while 
walking on a slippery sidewalk that was maintained by the municipal 
corporation. The municipality of hescott was protected by the provisions 
of the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 266 S. 480(3)" which provided as 
follows: 
Note 77 at 369. 
'' Supra, note 69. 
LI940 S .C .R. 688; cited with approval in Sememk v. Hamilton LI9951 O .  J. no. 
2271 (O.C.J.)(G.D.). 
Now, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, S. 284, as amended. 
"Except in the case of gross negligence a 
corporation shall not be liable for a personal injury 
caused by snow or ice upon a sidewaik." 
Haver v. Prescon, and HolZunù v. Cily of Torontog5 were both cases 
arising out of slip and fa11 accidents involving pedesmans where the standard 
was one of gross negligence. In Hurper v. Prescon the Supreme Court of 
Canada refbsed to assess the facts against a standard of recklessness or 
flagrant conduct. However, in Holland v. Cily of Toronto the Court applied 
a standard of reckless indifference. Those would appear to be confIicting 
statements of the law. 
Perhaps one of the most colourful definitions of gross negligence is 
that adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. Canada 
Stemhip  Limired. g6 
The case involved a clairn by Canada Steamship Lines against the 
Govenunent of Canada. Canada Steamship Lines was the lessee of a part of 
the port at Montreal, Quebec and the Govemment of Canada was the lessor. 
Clause 7 of the lease agreement provided as follows: 
"That the Lessee shall not have any claim or 
demand against the Lessor for detriment, damage 
[1927] S.C.R. 242; (1927) 59 Ont. L.R. 628 (S.C.C.). 
86 Supra, note 32. 
or injury of any nature to the said land, the said 
shed, the said platform, and the said canopy, or to 
any motor or other vehicles, materials, supplies, 
goods, articles, effects, or things at any time 
brought, placed, made, or being upon the said 
land, the said platform or in the said shed. " 
Employees of the Govemment of Canada caused a fire whiie carrying 
out repairs to the leased property. Canada Steamship Lines sought to recover 
its damages. 
Under Quebec law the clause excluding liability could not operate to 
avoid damages caused by gross negligence. It did operate to exempt liability 
for mere or ordinary negligence by the goverment of Canada, its servants 
or agents." 
On the facts of the case, Angers, J. of the Exchequer Coud8 
concluded the workmen were guilty of gross negligence or "faute lourde". 
Canada Steamship Lines could therefore recover against the defendant 
(Canada). 
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Rinfiet, C.J.C. noted: 
"It was comrnon ground that the gross negligence 
referred to in the judgment appealed from is the 
equivalent of what is called 'faute lourde' in the 
" The GZengoil Steamhip Co. ez al v. Pilkington et al (1897), 28 S.C.R. 146. 
a [1948] Ex.C.R. 635. 
French Civil Code, and it was not disputai either 
that the lease must be interpreted and applied 
according to the law of the Province of 
Quebec. "13' 
Rinfret, C .J-C. held that the question of whether 'faute lourde' exists 
is more than a question of fact because the decision maker must first 
properly define 'faute lourde'. To arrive at a proper definition contemplates 
a question of law. The proper definition is to be found in the works of 
Pothier . go His Lordship concluded: 
"On that point, it does not seem to me that one c m  
be on safer grounds that to adopt the definition of 
Pothier. This Iearned author, who might tnily be 
looked upon as being in most respects the basis of 
the Civil Code of Quebec, says that the 'faute 
lourde consiste à ne pas apporter aux affaires 
d'autrui le soin que les personnes les moins 
soigneuses et les plus stupides ne manquent pas 
d'apporter à leurs affaires. "'' 
That standard of gross negligence imposes a very low threshold upon 
would be tortfeasors. No liability would attach unless the plaintiff could 
establish that the defendant's conduct was more indifferent than the most 
* Supra. note 32 at 536. 
Robert Joseph Pothier, Osuvres de Pothier, M. Sifiein, Paris: 182 1. 
9' Supra, note 32 at 537. 
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careless and most stupid people wouid exercise towards their own 
interests .92 
One cm conclude the analysis of the various judgments touching on 
the issue of gross negligence by making the following observations: 
while the appropriate definition of gross negligence is a 
question of law, whether a set of circumstances constitutes 
gross negligence is a decision of fact to be decided by the trial 
judge; 
evidence of intentional or wilful conduct will not be necessary 
to establish gross negligence; 
the principle of res ipsa loquitor may be relied upon to establish 
gross negligence; 
what constitutes gross negligence will vary depending upon the 
facts of the case; however, at a very minimum it would seem 
prospective plaintiffs must prove very great negligence or a 
marked departure from the nom; 
when the Supreme Court of Canada refers to "serious or gross 
negligence" it is unclear whether the Court is speaking of 
equivalent standards or two different ones. The word 'serious' 
would seem to suggest a standard somewhere between mere 
negligence and gross negligence. 
Against this background the following suggestions may be of some 
assistance to jurists who are called upon to consider whether a particular set 
of circumstances constitutes serious or gross negligence: 
Supra, note 32 at 548. 
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How critical is the job interest? As addressed by board 
member Jamieson in Haley, does the grievance concem two 
hours of pay or the friture employability of the grievor? 
How critical is the grievance to the bargaining unit as a whole? 
1s it a policy grievance that might affect only two hours of pay 
today but potentiaily fi@ hours next month? 
Was the union's error the result of neglect or was there a bona 
fide effort on the part of the union to ensure the member was 
well served? 
Was the union's error, however well-intentioned, the result of 
a failure to seek outside counsel or engage adequate resources? 
Was the union's error one of omission or commission? 
1s the grievance process controlled exclusively by the union or 
is there an opportunity for individual action by the aggrieved 
employee? 
Does the matter concern employee rights flowing from 
grievance arbitration or contract negotiation. No doubt greater 
latitude will be afforded a union in matters of contract 
negotiation. 
Tite Arne- S&ndard 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that mere 
negligence is not sufficient to found liability against a union for breach of 
its duty of fair representation pursuant to the NdonaI Labour Relations 
Act. 93 
In United Steel Workers of Arnerica, AEL-CJO-CZC v. ~ a w s o n ~ ~  the 
union had, as part of the safety cornmittee duties referred to in the collective 
agreement, agreed to assist in mine inspections. When Rawson was killed 
in a mine fie, his estate sued in the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The issue was whether or not an action in simple negligence was pre- 
empted by operation of the federal National Labour Relations Act and S. 30 1 
of the Labour Management Relations Acr, 1947.95 
Although a c lah  for unfair representation could be brought in state 
or federal court, the federai law had to govem since the inspections were 
contemplated in the collective agreement. In relying upon its decision in 
Ford Motor Company v. Hu@zm the US. Supreme Court concluded as 
follows : 
93 49 Stat. 449, as amended; 29 U.S.C. S. 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). 
495 U.S. 362 (1990). 
95 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. S. 185 (a). 
"The courts have in general assumed that mere 
negligence even in the enforcement of a coilective 
bargaining agreement would not state a claim for 
breach of the duty of fair representation, and we 
endorse that view today. 
. . . a wide range of reasonableness must be 
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in 
serving the unit it represents. "% 
The Court concluded the federal law did preempt the action in the 
state court founded on mere or simple negligence. The union's conduct 
would be measured against a lower standard. 
The U.S. Supreme Court enunciated an even lower standard in Air 
Line Pilots Association v. In that case O'Neill and his fellow 
petitioners were opposed to the eventual settlement reached between their 
union, the Air Line Pilots Association and Continental Air Lines following 
a lengthy strike. Claiming the union had breached its duty toward them they 
sought to have the contract declared invalid. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would have found the settiement to have been 
arbitrary. It assessed arbitrariness based upon the following factors: 
1. whether the decision was based upon relevant, permissible 
union factors; 
% Supra. note 94 at 372. 
" 499 U.S. 65 (1991). 
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2. whether the decision was rational considering those factors; and 
3. whether there was a fair and impartial consideration of ail 
employees' interests. 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's analysis of 
the arbitrariness test holding that it would permit more judicial review of the 
substance of negotiation agreements than consistent with national labour 
policy . 98 
The appropriate standard was succinctly set out by Stevens, J. for the 
full court: 
"We further hold that a union's actions are 
arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal 
landscape at the tirne of the union's actions, the 
union's behaviour is so far outside a "wide range 
of reasonableness " , Ford Motor Co. v. Hu$jhun, 
345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953), as to be irrationalVg9 
(emphasis added) 
This test of irrationality applies to contract administration (grievances) as 
well as contract negotiation. lm 
That wide range of reasonableness has been interpreted differently by 
the various circuits of the United States Appeals Courts. 
98 Ibid at 77. 
Supra, note 97 page 72. 
Irn Supra, note 97 at 77. 
(i) Zrratrœonality: Extreme Recklessness to Intentional Cmduct 
The Seventh Circuit in the United States held that intentionai 
misconduct must be shown on the part of the union in order to establish a 
breach of the duty of fair representation. In Hoffnian v. Lonza lnc.'O1 the 
court held that an action based upon the union's duty to fairly represent its 
members might be more "properly labelled as an action for the union 
intentionally causing h m  to an employee.. . 11 102 
In Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern ~ a i l w a y ~ * ~  the Seventh Circuit 
reinforced the notion that intentional conduct on the part of the union is 
required in order to make the case for a plaintiff. The Court did opine that 
extreme recklessness might be sufficient to establish a breach of the duty but 
it would be so close to an intentional wrong that the treatment of the law 
would be the same. At page 112 of Graf the standard was described as 
follows: 
"The union has a duty to represent every worker 
in the bargaining unit fairly but it breaches that 
duty only if it deliberately and unjustifiably refuses 
to represent the worker. Negligence, everi gross 
negligence is not enough; and, obviously, 
'O' 658 F. 2d. 519 (7th Cir. 1981). 
'O2 Ibid. at 522. 
l m  697 F. 2d. 771 (7th Cir. 1983). 
intentional misconduct may not be inferred fkom 
negligence, whether simple or gross. Although 
extreme recldessness is so close to intentional 
wrongdoing that the law treats it as the same thing, 
we need not wony about that refhernent in this 
case. . . " 
Those who hold to the notion intentional misconduct is required to 
establish the claim, argue that to hold otherwise might encourage collusion 
between the union and employee. An employee whose chances of success 
at grievance arbitration are not good might encourage his union to make a 
mistake in pursuing the grievance, thereby providing hirn the opportunity to 
bring suit against the employer under Section 301 of the Labour 
Management Relations Act, 1947 seeking reinstatement. With respec!, this 
concem is easily remedied by ensuring that the reinstatement remedy not be 
available to the Court. With respect to cornplaints arising out of the 
grievaace process, the remedies could no doubt be limited to an award of 
costs and the referral of the matter to arbitration. 
Another justification for limiting relief to situations where the union 
has acted intentionally is that unions are to a large extent volunteer 
organizatiom whose stewards lack the ski11 and training that is necessary to 
hold them to a professional malpractice standard. Frankly, there is very 
little cornparison between intentional misconduct and the standard imposed 
62 
upon professionals. It would seem one could at least reach the g r a s  
negligence standard without irnposing a professional standard of care upon 
union executives. AIso, given the contractual relationship that exists 
between a member and his or her union, it is reasonable to expect the 
member wouid be entitled to the best possible representation. 
(ii) Zrrationality: Tire Negligence Standards 
Another refinement of the Vaca v. Sipes standard requires a union to 
rationally explain impugned conduct. This view holds that if a union cannot 
rationaily explain its actions, it will be in violation of its duty to fairly 
represent. Bu: for the gross negligence component of the Canadian standard 
of care, the test adopted by the Fifth Circuit of the United States Federal 
Court in Tedford v. Peaboày Coal Co. 'O4 bears smking resemblance to 
that adopted by Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in Centre Hospitalier 
Regina Ltee., supra. At page 957 in Tedford the Court held: 
"We think a decision to be non-arbitrary must be 
(1) based upon relevant, permissible union factors 
which exclude the possibility of it being based 
upon motivations such as personal animosity or 
political favouritism; (2) a rational result of the 
consideration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of 
- -  - -  
'" 533 F. 2d. 952 (5th Cir. 1976). 
a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of 
al1 employees . " 
The distinction between the intentional misconduct standard and that 
requiring a rational explanation of union conduct appears to be a matter of 
proof. For those who hold to the former, the plaintiff must prove intent on 
the part of the executive. That c m  be a very heavy onus. The rational 
explanation standard would appear to assist plaintiffs in that "intent", if 
necessary, is presumed. The union must then provide some rational 
explanation of its conduct. Much like the application of principles of res ipsa 
loquitor that were applied in Goulais v. Restoule Ertate, the rational 
explanation test would, in most cases, require the defendant to produce some 
evidence in order to defeat a clairn. 
In Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co.'OS the employee complained 
about the union's representation of him following his discharge as a result 
of a customer cornplaint. The union presented the employee's grievance, 
challenged the employer's assessrnent of the facts and permitted the 
employee to be personally present at a joint arbitration cornmittee. The 
commiaee upheld the discharge. The employee felt there was no lawfûl 
justification for his discharge and brought action in court against his union 
I M  668 F. 2d. 1204 (11th Cir. 1982). 
and the employer. At page 1207 the court concluded: 
"Nothing less than a demonstration that the union 
acted with reckless disregard for the employee's 
rights or was grossly deficient in its conduct will 
suffice to establish such a claim." 
In Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport ~ 0 . l ~  the facts do not 
appear to constitute p s s  negligence. The plaintiff was discharged by his 
employer one month after he settled a civil law suit for personal injuries he 
had suffered while at work. The company took the position he was 
discharged because he could no longer perform the duties required of his 
position as a result of the injuries suffered by him. The employee's own 
doctor concluded he was 25% disabled. In assessing the merits of the 
grievance the union officiais only considered the medical report of the 
employee's doctor. They neglected to request the company doctor's 
assessment. That assessment found the employee suffering from no 
disabilities . 
Given that the ernployee had just cornpleted a civil action against his 
employer, an astute lawyer would no doubt have concluded that the 
company's medical report might be more favourable to the employee as a 
tactic to limit any damage award against the company. Similarly, an astute 
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counsei may well have concluded that the medicd report from the 
employee's own doctor might portray the injuries in the worst possible light 
in order to ensure adequate compensation. Unfortunately, the union 
representative failed to examine the company medical report and concluded 
there was no merit to the grievance. 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that "grossly deficient conduct" on the 
part of the union could constitute arbiîrary conduct necessary to support a 
fïnding that the union had not respected its duty to fairly represent the 
employee. In watt  the court concluded that failure to request the company 
medical report was grossly deficient conduct. With respect, while the 
failure to request the company report might constitute negligence 1 would 
suggest there is a substantial subjective assessrnent by the court in equating 
such a failure with gross negligence. Negligent perhaps, arbitrary or grossly 
negligent? I doubt it. 
This case, where the statement of the standard is very similar to the 
Canadian definition of gross negligence is an excellent example of 
interpretation of the facts designed to ensure a remedy regardless of the 
label one employs to describe the standard. With respect, this approach is 
evident in the vast majority, if not all of the cases discussed, supra. 
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Based upon the decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, it would 
appear that the simple negligence standard does not constitute any part of the 
duty of fair representation in American jurispmdence. However, a Iimited 
role for the rnere negligence standard has been accepted in a least two 
American jurisdictions . 
In Dutrisuc v .  Cuterpillar Tractor Co. '" the facts were very similar 
to those in Brenda Haley, supra. The union had inadvertently failed to file 
a grievance on cime. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance as being 
untimely. The employee sued the union for breach of duty owed to him. 
The Ninth Circuitlog reached the opposite conclusion fiom the Canadian 
Labour Relations Board in Haley. In upholding the employee's clairn, the 
Court made a distinction between ministerial acts and discretionary acts 
undertaken by the union. Simple negligence would not be sufficient to 
found a cornplaint in circumstances where the union considers the pros and 
cons of certain action and then exercises its discretion in making its 
decision. However, where the individual interest at stake is high and the 
'O7 749 F. 2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1982). 
'O8 A sixniiar resuit was reached in Vend v. I n t e ~ o n a i  Union of Operming 
Engineers 137 F .  3d. 420 (6th Cir . 1998) and Ruzicka v. Geneml Motors Corpororion 523 
F.2d. 306 (6th Cir. 1975). It seems American courts are quite willing to define 
"arbitrary" as negligent when critical job interests are at stake. 
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union's failure to complete a ministerial act completely extinguishes the 
ernployee's claim, simple or mere negligence is the standard that will be 
applied.lo9 This has been accomplished, however, by categorizing 
negligence in those circumstances as arbitrary conduct. 
In the following chapter we will see that in those Canadian Provinces 
where the duty of fair representation has not been codified (the Maritime 
Provinces), the weight of judicial opinion is that trade unions will be held 
liable for harm resulting from acts of simple negligence. This has been 
accomplished boldly, in a direct and forthright manner, with the policy 
issues well articulated by the various courts. 
'09 See. Vend, supra. note 108 at 426 where the court concluded "absent justification 
or excuse, a union's nepligent failure to take a basic and required step, unrelated to the 
nature of the grievance, is a clear example of arbitrary conduct. " 
Union Liability For Simple Negligence in Canada 
In those provinces where the union duty of fair representation has 
been codified, the weight of authority holds there is no room for action 
against a union arising out of ordinary or simple negligence.lIO This 
seems to be the inevitable conclusion given the relatively clear statements 
from the Supreme Court of Canada in Gagnon, Gendron, and Centre 
Hospitalier. As a result of codification, courts in those jurisdictions were 
provided with little, if any, oppoftuirity to consider the relationship between 
unions and their members. This naturally resulted in a halting of the 
evolution and refinement of the duty of fair representation that one would 
otherwise expect from those courts. However, an analysis of the history of 
the duty before codification, an examination of the jurisdictiond issues 
decided by the courts, and pronouncements of lower courts across Canada 
leave room for argument that in at least the three common law Provinces 
"O See, Moldowan v. Saskatchewan Govenvnent Employees Union (1993). 108 
D.L.R. (4th) 132 (Sask. Q.B.); overtunied (1995). 126 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Sask. C.A.); 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied [1995] S. CC. A. No. 46 1 ; and 
Mulherin v. United Steelworkers of America Local 7884 (1985), B.C.L.R. 347 (S.C.); 
overturned (1987) 37 D.L.R. (4th) 333; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
denied [1987] 1 S.C.R. xi; 57 N.R. 156. 
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where the duty has not been codified (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and 
Prince Edward Island), a union may be liable for mere negligence. Also, 
in Newfoundiand, where at least part of the duty has been codified, there is 
strong judicial pronouncement in support of the position that a plaintiff has 
a claim based upon simple negligence where a critical job interest is at 
In Copormion de Batteries Cegelect'12, Briere, J. suggested that 
simple negligence could constitute serious negligence as contemplated by 
paragraph 38(b) of the Quebec Lobour Code113, the English version of 
which reads as follows: 
"A certified association shail not act in bad faith or 
in an arbitrary or discriminatory marner or show 
serious negligence in respect of employees 
comprised in a bargainhg unit represented by it, 
whether or not they are members. " 
Briere, J. in anticipation of facts similar to those in Haley, where 
simple negligence denied an employee her right to grieve dismissal, 
concluded as follows at page 335: 
See, Bzitt v. United Steelworkers ' of Amerka, et al (1993). 106 Nfld. & PELR 18 1 
(Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.); (1994) 118 Nfld. & PEIR 303 (Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.). 
lL2 [1978] T.T. 328. 
I l 3  R.S.Q. 1977 c. C-27; now section 47.2. 
"In my understanding, the legislator here has not 
wanted, despite the ambiguity of the text which 
seems, in effect, to require proof of serious 
negligence, to Iimit this recourse to the point 
where an employee will be, for example, definitely 
deprived of his right to arbitration of his grievance 
if he is able to establish oniv simple negligence by 
his union ... 1 do not hesitate to Say that a slight 
error (for example, a simple act of forgetting) 
which brings about the loss of recourse to 
arbitration capable of saving an employee's 
employment, truly constitutes serious negligence. " 
The case for liability in ordinary negligence was accepted by the triai 
division of the British Columbia Superior Court in Stoyles v. United 
Steelworkers Local 7619' l4 and Mulherin v . United Steelworkers Local 
7884.''' In both Stoyles and Mulherin the superior court concluded that 
an action lies against a trade union brought by a union member in simple 
negligence. In reaching their conclusions both the Court of Appeal in 
Stoyles and the superior court in MuZherin held that section 7 of the British 
Columbia Maur codelL6, being the codification of the union duty of fair 
representation, did not oust the jurisdiction of the court to consider a daim 
of negligence against a union by a member. In order to reach that 
I l 4  (1984), 55 B.C.L.R. 107 (C.A.); Ieave to appeal to the S.C.C. refuseci 57 N.R. 
156. 
Il5 Supra, note 110. 
Il6 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212. 
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conclusion, it was essential to find that ordinary or mere negligence did not 
form part of the codification of the duty of fair representation. 
Interestingly, the lawyer for the union in Mulherin argued that mere 
negligence was caught by the codification set out in section 7. This 
approach was necessary in order to make the argument that the Labour Code 
was a complete code and there was no jurisdiction left with the courts in 
relation to the duty. This argument was rejected by the trial judge in 
Muïherin who stated as follows in concluding he did have jurisdiction: 
"It goes without saying of course, that the 
legislature could have included any desired level of 
negligence in section 7(1) but it did not do so and 
1 do not think 1 shouid read that concept into the 
section. It follows that an allestation of common 
law neglirrence in a case such as this may be tried 
in this court and there will be an order 
accordinelv. " (emphasis added) 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal overtumed the mal decision 
in Mulherin on the basis that the codification ousted the jurisdiction of the 
courts. It overtumed its earlier decision in Stoyles since that decision pre- 
dated Gendron. It concluded the oniy duty imposed upon a union is to act 
without hostility or discrimination, avoid arbitrary conduct and to exercise 
its discretion in good faith. Following Gendron, it concluded there is no 
common law duty outside the duty adopted in Fisher v. Pemberton which 
was now codified. 
In spite of the decisions in Cagnon and Gendron, courts in New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland appear willing to impose 
liability upon a trade union for mere negligence in relation to the 
representation of its members . 
In Knighr et al v. Canadm Brotherhood of Railway. Transport and 
General Workers et al1'' several ernployees who were rnembers of the 
defendant union brought action in the trial division of the Court of Queen's 
Bench for damages, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary 
duty and breach of the duty of fair representation. 
The legislative framework goveming the parties was the Canada 
Labour Code.lL8 At the relevant rime, section 136.1 of the Canada 
Labour Code setting out the duty of fair representation had been enacted. 
Also, the trial and appeal courts had the benefit of the decisions in Fisher 
v. Pemberton, Gagnon, Mulherin, and St. Anne Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. 
Ltd. v. Canadan Papeworkers Union. Local 219. 
The defendant union brought a motion before Russell, J. of the Court 
"' (1988). 95 N.B.R. (2d) 342 (C.A.). 
'18 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amendeci. 
of Queen's Bench seeking to strike out the claim. It aUeged the Canada 
Labour Code ousted the common law junsdiction of the Court of Queen's 
Bench. The trial judge concluded the claims did not arise out of rights 
created by the collective agreement; the corn was therefore clothed with 
jurisdiction. 
In the Court of Appeal, Russell, J .3 judgment was upheld to the 
extent that claims alleging fraud, deceit, misrepresentatim and breach of 
fiduciary duty could proceed before the trial division of the Court of 
Queen's Bench. The Court of AppeaI did, however, allow the appeal to the 
extent that it concluded the courts had no jurisdiction to address the claim 
for breach of the statutory duty of fair representation. In Knight no claim 
had been made alleging simple negligence. The decision is, however, 
significant in that the Court approved other common law claims against a 
union in spite of the codification of the duty of fair representation. 
The liability of a union for the tortious actions of its agents was aIso 
the subject of the court action in David Duke v. The Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers. l lg The plaintiff brought action against his union 
alleging it was negligent in its representation of him in relation to an 
(1989), 98 N.B.R. (2d) 99 (Q.B.D.)(T.D.). 
arbitration hearing held to consider the question of his dismissal by the 
Canadian National Railway Company. As in Knight, the provisions of the 
C d  Laaour Code applied, cornplete with the codification set out in 
section 37 (previousiy 136.1). 
At mai, Creaghan, J. carefully analyzed the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Gagnon and concluded that a daim in simple negligence against a 
trade union by a union member for matters arising out of the collective 
agreement is actionable in New Brunswick. This even where the duty has 
been codified by the Canada Labour Code. 1 can do no better than to quote 
extensively from Judge Creaghan's decision in explaining why a trade union 
operating in today's environment should be liable for the negligent 
representation of one of its members. His Lordship opined as follows: 
"The law is clear 
common law. The 
representation has 
Court of Canada 
bat a duty of fair representation exists at 
standard of care Uiherent in the duty of fair 
been definitively set out by the Supreme 
in Canadian Merchant Service Guild v. 
Gagnon et al, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 509; 53 N.R. 100; 9 D.L.R. 
(4th) 64 1. This standard is stated by Chouinard, J. at page 654 
D .L.R. of Gamon and is well summarized in the headnote as 
reported in that case as follows: 
'A union has a duty of fair representation arising 
out of its exclusive power to act as bargainhg 
agent for al1 employees in a bargaining unit. 
Where a union has the right to decide whether to 
take a grievance to arbitration, the union's 
discretion mut be exercised in good faith, 
objectively and honestly, after a thorough study of 
the grievance and the case, taking into account the 
significance of the grievance and of the 
consequences for the employee and the legitimate 
interest of the union. The union's decision must 
not be arbitrary, capricious, without serious or 
major negligence and without hostility towards the 
employee. ' 
The legislature, subsequent to the tirne the cause of action arose 
in Gagnon but prior to the decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, established fair representation as a statutory duty in 
section 136.1 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.L- 
1.. . The present section 37 (fomerly section 136.1) of the 
Canada Labour Code sets out the statutory duty in the following 
terms : 
'37. Duty of faU representation 
A trade union or representative of a trade union 
that is the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit 
shail not act in a rnanner that is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith in the representation 
of any of the employees in the unit with respect to 
their rights under the collective agreement that is 
applicable to them. ' 
The Court of Appeal of British Columbia, relying on the 
analysis of the evolution of the duty of fair representation set 
out in Gagnon, has clearly determined that there is no duty of 
care on which a clairn for negligence rnay be made by a 
member against his union other than that embraced by the duty 
of fair representation. Bowcott v. Canadian Brotherhood of 
Railwa~, Trans~ort and General Workers. Local 400 et al 
(1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 198. 
The corollary of the British Columbia decision in Bowcott is 
that since the duty of fair representation is now a statutory duty 
embodied in the Canada Labour Code, in matters such as the 
instant case where the Code applies, exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether a breach of such a duty has occurred lies 
with the Canada Labour Relations Board and that the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia has no jurisdiction to hear a claim 
for negligence by a member against its union with respect to 
the standard of care exercised in the course of representing a 
member 's interests , " 
At this point in the judgment we see that Creaghan, J. has a clear grasp of 
the issue confronting him. He is very cognizant of the distinction between 
union actions arising out of its representation of a member vis-a-vis the 
employer and other circumstances that might arise. Should he conclude a 
standard of mere negligence applies to a union's representation of its 
members in the face of codification he would be interpreting Gagnon 
differently than did the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Bowcott, supra. 
His Lordship continues : 
"The New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Canadian Brotherhood 
of Railway. Transport and General Workers et al v. Roger 
Knkht et al .. . adopted a less restrictive position. Although 
clearly Knipht holds that a breach of the duv of fair 
representation as defined by the Canada Labour Code falls 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Relations 
Board , at the same time the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
found that there are other tortious acts founded in common law 
which are independent of a statutory duty of fair representation 
and for which an action may be properly brought within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick 
by a member against his union with respect to the manner in 
which it represents his interests. 
The causes of action are limited to those other than a breach of 
the statutory duty of fair representation as set out in section 37 
of the Canada Labour Code. In this category the court allows 
daims alleging fkaud, deceit, misrepresentation and breach of 
fiduciary duty but does not suggest that the specified causes of 
action are an exhaustive list. 
While the New Brunswick Court of A ~ p e d  in Knight does not 
s~ecificall~ reference negligence as one of the tortious causes 
of action that  ma^ be brou . its apparent approval of the trial 
iudge's remarks that the specified causes of action were "among; 
others" gives rise to the inference that it has read Gagnon less 
resaictivelv than was done b~ the Court of Appeal of British 
Columbia in Bowcott. (emphasis added) 
1 have concluded with some hesitation, based on the decision in 
Kni~ht, that although Gamon does include "serious or major 
negligence" within the context of the duty of fair 
representation, the law in New Brunswick allows a further 
cause of action based on a dutv of care bv which a union must 
act in a reasonablv prudent and diligent manner in the 
re~resentation of its members . (emphasis added) 
This du@ of care is in addition to and not embraced bv the 
statutory du- of fair representation set out in the Canada 
Labour Code which provides o n l ~  that a union shall not act in 
a rnanner that is "arbitrarv. discriminato~ or in bad faith in the 
representation of any of the employees in the unit with respect 
to their rights under the collective agreement that is applicable 
to hem" . Knight, holds that there are other obligations of 
conduct placed upon a union outside the statutory duty of fair 
representation and the duty of fair representation founded in 
cornmon law stated in Gagnon, seen in the context that a 
"union's decision must not be arbiaary, capricious, 
discriminatory or wrongful" . (emphasis added) 
Even with the opening provided by Knight, 1 am aware that the 
conclusion that a common law duty of care exists giving rise to 
a claim for negligence against a union by a member nins 
counter to the weight of authority . 
It is clear that Canadian labour board jurisprudence has taken 
the position that negligence does not constitute a breach of tke 
duty of fair representation and that no further duty exists. It is 
also clear that labour board jurispmdence has sbxggled with the 
concept of negIigence as it should apply to union responsibility 
in the representation of its members. " 
After noting that his decision goes against the weight of authority, 
Creaghan, J. then explained why the earlier considerations used to justiS a 
lower standard were no longer relevant. He attacks certain assumptions that 
are no longer relevant in today's society. He States: 
"It must be recognized however that the duty of fair 
representation both as defined in statute and as developed at 
common law in Gagnon was Iimited by certain assumptions that 
may not be as valid as they once were. 
To see serious or gross negligence as arbitrary but to see 
"simple" negligence as acceptable does not seem logical in the 
environment of today's labour relations. First it imposes a 
subjective standard that is bound to produce varying ad hoc 
decisions on whether negligent conduct is sufficiently senous 
conduct to be considered arbitrary. More importantly it is 
based on the premise that union officials who represent their 
members should not be held to a higher duty than that of the 
duty of fair representation. 
Today union officials are well trained in their responsibilities 
and at the higher levels, where the responsibility for processing 
grievances such as the instant case lies, they occupy full-time 
positions and have ready access to information and expertise. 
Union officials for the great part cannot be seen as 
unsophisticated volunteers. The facts in this case, and the 
manner of their testimony at mal, clearly indicates that the 
union representatives responsible in the case were 
knowledgeable and competent in dealing with the rights of their 
members . 
Nor c m  it be realistically argued that the remedy for negligent 
representation lies in the threat that representatives will be 
replaced by the membership. The politics of union organization 
is not that simple and further it offers no opportunity for relief 
to the employee who has suffered as a result of negligent 
representation. 
It is no longer realistic to see a union in the context of some 
fratemal organization where unsophisticated officers speak on 
behalf of their membership. A mature union, such as the 
defendant in this case, is a highly organized and professionally 
managed institution well able to undertake its responsibility that 
being the exclusive representation of the economic interests of 
those it represents. 
It is tnie that the standard of care must not be too demanding. 
Union representatives should not be expected to act as lawyers. 
In my view, however, I can see no reason why the standard of 
reasonableness cannot be applied nor why union representatives 
should not be held accountable for negligence just as would any 
person who accepts the exclusive right and responsibility to 
represent the rights of others and upon whom such persons rely 
for the protection of their rights. To Say that a union must act 
in a reasonably prudent and diligent manner is not too hi@ a 
standard given the reality of the development of union 
representation today . 
Accordingly, 1 have decided that a union's breach of a duty to 
act in a reasonably pmdent and diligent manner gives rise to an 
action in negligence which falls outside the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Relation's (sic) Board and 
which may be brought in the Court of Queen's Bench of New 
Brunswick. " 
Clearly, according to Mr. Justice Creaghan the modem, well-trained union 
executive should not benefit from the lesser standard imposed upon it that 
would require a member to prove senous or gross negligence in order to 
found a cause of action against the union. 
A third case from New Brunswick also lends support to the 
proposition that a union is liable for negligent acts committed against its 
membership, whether or not those acts constitute serious or major 
negligence. In Gerald Dutcher v. Construction and General Lubourers ' and 
General Workers (Construction, Commercial, Industrial), Local Union IO79 
and Labourers' International Union of North ~rnerica'~~ the COUR was not 
confronted with any statutorily defined duty of fair representation as was the 
case in Duke and Gendron. The court found itself in the same position as 
the Suprerne Court in Gagnon. That is, it codd define a standard of care 
in the fused court of law and equity in a jurisdiction where the union's duty 
had not been codified. In Dutcher, the Court had the benefit of the 
'" (199û), 110 N.B.R. (2d) 368 (Q.B.D.)(T.D.). 
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decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Gagnon, Gendm,  and Centre 
Hospitalier Regina Ltee v. Prud'homme. 
After carefully analyzing the various decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada touching on the issue of the union duty of fair representation as 
well as those of his fellow jurists in New Brunswick in Knight and Duke, 
Mclntyre, J. concluded that a clairn based upon negligence could be brought 
by a union member against his or her union. He concluded that the union 
has a responsibiiity to act in a reasonably prudent and diligent manner in the 
representation of its members . 
The case for a more stringent standard upon trade unions adopted by 
the courts in New Brunswick has recently found favour in the superior 
courts of Saskatchewan and Newfoundland. 
In Saskatchewan the cornmon law duty of fair representation was 
codified by S. 25.1 of the Trade Union ~ c t ' ~ ' .  In Moldowan v. 
Smkatchewan Governmenr Employees ' Union, et al1* the plaintiff s 
grievance was disrnissed by reason of the defendant union's delay in 
constituting the arbitration board. The plaintiff brought action against the 
12' R.S.S. 1978 c. T-17 as amendeci. 
'" Supra, note 110. 
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union alleging negligence or breach of the duty of fair representation under 
the Trade Union Act. With respect to the c l a h  in negligence, the court 
concluded that since it was not clear whether negligence was covered under 
the statutory definition of fair representation, the jurisdiction of the court in 
the area of negligence was not ousted. 
In concluding that the plaintiff could proceed before the superior court 
with an action based upon breach of the union duty of fair representation in 
this case, the court obsewed that the remedies available under the 
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act were not as al1 inclusive as those available 
undet the Canada Labour Code which were considered in Gendron. 
Schiebel, J. noted that at page 13 19 of her decision in Gendron, L'Heureux- 
Dubé, J. aclaiowledged the limits of her decision in the following terms: 
"A necessary caveat to this conclusion is that, 
while the common law duty will be inoperative in 
a situation where the terms of the statute apply , a 
different conclusion may be warranted in a case 
where the statute is silent or by its tems cannot 
apply . " 
This caveat was important to the trial judge as he compared the remedial 
powers available under the Trade Union Acr of Saskatchewan with those 
available under the Canada Labour Code. 
Since the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board did not have the 
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power to award damages, it foilowed that the jurisdiction of the courts was 
not ousted by reason of necessary implication. The Legislature of 
Saskatchewan had not expressed an intention to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts with irresistible clarity . lu 
Not oniy did Scheibel J. conclude an action lay in the superior court 
in Saskatchewan for breach of the duty of fair representation, he also 
concluded an action lay grounded upon negligence other than that caught by 
the ambit of the duty of fair representation. He was of the view the 
Legislature had not stated with irresistible clarity that common law 
negligence was subsumed by the statutory duty of fair representation. Since 
it was not, the jurisdiction of the court in the area of negligence had not 
been ousted. l x  
In Moldowan the union appealed. In the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeallzs decision, the trial judge's incisive reasoning was, with respect, 
123 This test of irresistible clarity has been regularly employed in order to determine 
whether the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted. See, for example, Goodyear Tire, [1956] 
S.C.R. 610; Dominion C m e r s  Ltd. v. Casrama, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 551 (S.C.C.); 
Narionul T m  CO. V .  Christian Commfu~ity of Universal Brotherhood, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 
529 (S.C.C.), [1941] S.C.R. 601. 
12' See also, Collins v. Transport di Allied Workers Union, Local 85.5 (1991), 92 
C.L.L.C. 14018; 94 Nfld. & P.E.1.R 346 (Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.); and Bun v. United 
Steelworkers of America, Local 5795 (1993), 106 Nfld. & P.E.1.R 181 
(N£ld.S.C.)(T.D.). 
lZI Supra, note 110. 
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subjected to an erroneous application of the facts and the law set out in 
Gendron. The leamed justices concluded that since the Cu& Labour Code 
ousted the jurisdiction of the common law courts, so too must the 
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act. This, in spite of the fact the duty of fair 
representation is described differently in both statuteslt6; and, more 
significantly, in spite of the fact that the Canada Labour Code made 
widesweeping remedies available to the Canada Labour Relations Board, 
including the power to award damages, which as noted, supra, were not 
then available tu the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board. 
Bearing in mind that the Gagnon and Gendron cases define the duty 
of fair representation and do not purport to determine whether a c l a h  lay 
in ordinary negligence against a union by a union member, it is troubling 
that a Court possessed of inherent jurisdiction would so willingly abdicate 
its jurisdiction in the field o f  ordinary negligence. After referring to his 
understanding of the common Law duty- of fair representation, Jackson, J. A. 
concluded : 
"Thus the common law duty has, as part of its 
content, a prohibition against serious or major 
negligence. There are not then two causes of 
action: the common law breach of the duty of fair 
'' See Appendix "A", infro. 
representation and negligent representation. 
Negligence is subsumed in the common law duty 
to the extent of serious or major negligence. " 
One must ask "Why?". What is there about a trade union that is by law 
granted the capacity to sue and be sued that makes it immune fiom an action 
in negligence? 
The Court of Appeal in Moldowan, answered that question, in part, 
by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in St. Anne 
Nackawic Pu@ & Paper Co. v.  Canadian Paperworkers ' Union. Local 219, 
supra. As noted earlier, the 3. Anne Nackmvic case was aiso relied upon by 
L'Heureux-Dubé, J. in Gendron to justi@ the ousting of the jurisdiction of 
the common law courts in the face of the legislative provisions of the 
CanCLdQ Labour Code. 
With respect, the reliance upon the St. Anne Nackawic case by the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to deny 
citizens access to the courts for wrongs cornmitted by unions against 
members is not weil-founded. St. Anne Nackmvic examined the jurisdiction 
of the courts to deal with various wrongs committed during a wild-cat strike. 
The strike was contrary to the terms of the collective agreement which 
provided that there shall be no strikes or lock-outs d u ~ g  its term. The 
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employer sought to sue the union for damages. The court held that the 
strike constituted a violation of the terms of the collective agreement. 
Pursuant to section 55 of the Industriai Relations ~n~~~ of New 
Brunswick, al1 disputes conceming the interpretation or application of the 
collective agreement must be resolved by binding arbitration. The 
jurisdiction of the Court had thereby been ousted. 
In the aftermath of St. Anne Nackawic it has been generally concluded 
that in the master-servant relationship, al1 rnatters contemplated by a 
collective agreement between the employer and employees must be dealt 
with by arbitration. In the face of legislation requiring al1 disputes be settied 
by binding arbitration, such a conclusion makes abundant good sense. 
However, to use that case to attempt to resolve intra-union problems, 
is, with respect, erroneous. Consider the features that distinguish the facts 
in St. Anne NackQwic from those ir, MoMowan: 
(i) in St. Anne Nackawic the lis was between the employer and 
employees; in Moldowan the lis was between a union and a 
member served by it; 
(ii) in St. Anne Nackavic a written contract existed between the 
-- 
12' R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4, as amended. 
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two litigants; in Moldowm no written contract existed between 
the two litigants; 
(iii) in St. Anne Nackawic a strongly worded section of the 
Industrial Relations Act provided that ail disputes between the 
litigants arising out of the terms of the collective agreement 
must be resolved by binding arbitration; in Moldowan no 
provision of the Trade Union Act provided that disputes 
between a union and its members must be resolved by the 
Labour Relations Board; 
(iv) in St. Anne Nackawic the arbitrator possessed authority to 
award damages; in Moldowan the Labour Relations Board had 
no authority to award damages to the employee; 
(v) in St. Anne Nackavic there was no fiduciary duty of any kind 
between the litigants, in fact, they were adversarial; in 
Moldowan the employee relies upon the union to protect his or 
her interest and is paying a fee by way of union dues to ensure 
that happens; 
(vi) in St. Anne Nackawic a bargaining relationship existed between 
the two parties. Legislation is written under the assumption 
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they both corne to the bargaining table with strength; in 
Moldowan no bargaining relationship exists between the 
litigants. The union member is totally at the mercy of the 
union. 
Based upon the above analysis, it is subrnitted that any effort to apply 
the principles of Sr. Anne Nackavic to the situation where an employee is 
seeking to redress a perceived wrong against the union is dl- con~eived. '~~ 
If  the Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces wished to 
bar actions against unions in such circumstances, there is substantial 
precedent for the appropriate statutory language. The approach of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Moldowun, is, with respect, the result of 
blind adherence to perceived precedent without a careful analysis of whether 
or not the cases relied upon are tnily precedent-setting to the case under 
review. As noted, even L'Heureux-Dubé, J.  in Gendron urged caution in 
applying her decision to other cases where the statute rnight read differently. 
The St. Anne Nuckawic case was recently applied by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Weber v. Unturio HydrdZg and New Brunswick v. 
See, Young v. United Mine Workers of Amencn, Local No. 7606 (1988), 48 
D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Sask. Q. B.). 
'" (1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th) 583 (S.C.C.). 
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O'Lec~ry.'~~ Can it be said that those cases lend support to the proposition 
that relief in simple negligence is unavaiiable to a union member who makes 
a claim against his union? I would suggest to the contrary . Weber actually 
assists in a small way those who argue a union should be liable for simple 
negligence arising out of a union's representation of its members. 
In Weber v. Ontario Hydro, the employer believed the plaintiff to be 
malingering in relation to sick leave claims. The employer engaged a private 
investigator who obtained access to the employee's home. As a result of the 
investigation the employee was terrninated. His union filed a grievance 
which was eventually settled prior to arbitration. However, in addition to 
the filing of the grievance, Mr. Weber commenced a court action in which 
he claimed damages for the torts of trespass, nuisance, deceit and invasion 
of privacy. He also sued for breach of his section 7 and 8 rights under the 
Cu&ian Charter of Rights and ~reedorns.'~' At trial the employer's 
motion to dismiss was granted on the basis that the dispute arose out of the 
collective agreement. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed, citing St. Anne 
Nackawic where Estey, J. concluded in part as follows: 
(1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (S.C.C.) .  
13* Conmnmtution Act, 1982. 
"This relationship is properly regulated through 
arbitration and it would, in generai, subvert both 
the relationship and the statutory scheme under 
which it aises to hold that matters addressed and 
governeci by the collective ameement may 
nevertheless be the subject of action in the courts 
at common law . " L32 (emphasis added) 
With respect, nothing new flows from Weber or O Zeary that would oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts in matters relating to claims in simple negligence 
by a member against his or her union. 
In Weber, the Court accepted the exclusive jurisdiction mode1 which 
holds that if the difference arises from the collective agreement, the claimant 
must proceed by arbitration and the Courts have no power to entertain an 
action in respect of that dispute. There can be no overlapping jurisdiction. 
The Court also acknowledged it is impossible to categorize the classes of 
cases that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 
Interestingly, in identifjing those areas in which the courts Iack jurisdiction 
McLachlin, J. writing for the majority at page 602 cited Burt in support of 
her position that only disputes "expressly or inferentially arising out of the 
collective agreement are foreclosed to the courts. "133 AS will be seen, 
13* Supra, note 129 at 599 (D.L.R.). 
13' Supra, note 129 at 603. 
infia, in Buîi, L. D. Barry, J. concluded that an action lay at common law 
in negligence in spite of Newfoundland's effort at codiQing the duty of fair 
representation. The apparent acceptance of the decision in Bun would appear 
to nui counter to the interpretation given to the Supreme Court of Canada 
in such decisions and MoMowan and M u l h e k  In fact Moldowan 
specifically rejected the approach taken in Butt. Yet, as we have seen, 
supra, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Moldowan. 
In the event the apparent acceptance of Bun, following its rejection in 
Moldowan, is not confusing, consider the following excerpt from Mme. 
Justice McLachlan at page 23 of Weber: 
"This does not mean that the arbitrator will 
consider separate "cases" of tort, contract or 
charter. Rather, in dealing with the dispute under 
the collective agreement and fashioning an 
appropriate remedy , the arbitrator will have regard 
to whether the breach of the collective agreement 
also constitutes a breach of a common law duty or 
of the Charter. " 134 
1 fail to understand or appreciate why an arbitrator would be 
concerned about whether a common law duty had been breached. Assuming 
an arbitrator determined he or she had jurisdiction it would appear there is 
'" While arbitrators right to determine breaches of Charter rights was confmned in 
such mes as Douglar/KwuntZen Facul@ AssociahQnon v. Douglas College (1990), 77 
D.L.R. (4th) 94 1 am unaware that arbitrators determine breaches of common law duties. 
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no room for consideration of common law duties. 1 know of no common law 
duty enforceable by an arbitrator. If he has no jurisdiction to enforce a 
common law remedy, then why would he or she find it necessary to "have 
regard" to the issue of whether or not a common law duty had been 
breached? Furthemore, the t h s t  of St. Anne Nackawic, Gendron and 
Weber was to deny access to common law remedies. 
In those provinces where there is a statutory duty of fair 
representation, there is no equivalent to section 55 of the New Brunswick 
Industrial Relations Act or section 45 of the Ontario Lubour Relations 
 AC?'^^ cequiring al1 disputes between the union and its members be 
governed by a dispute resolution process separate from the courts. It should 
not be presumed that even in those jurisdictions where the duty of fair 
representation has been codified, labour legislation is a complete statutory 
scheme designed to govem a lis between a union and one of its members. 
If the labour legislation enacted in each Province is to be a cornpiete 
scheme goveming labour relations, it could be argued in the extreme that an 
employer, upon being assaulted by an employee while at work over a 
dispute about work assignment, would have no right to sue for assault. 
- --- - 
'35 R.S.O. 1990 C. L.2, as amended. 
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Could it not be argued based upon a very smct interpretation of Weber and 
St. Anne Nackavc that the employer could f i e  the employee and grieve the 
assauit? But for the employee being at work and govemed by the 
employment relationship, the assault would not have occurred. Such an 
analysis is no more unreasonable, nor any less plausible than a reading of 
St. Anne Nackawic that would apply it to intra-union problems when that 
case's sole focus was on the employer-union relationship and the 
interpretation of the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, that, on its 
face, did appear to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 
It is achowledged that the weight of judicial authority holds there is 
no actionable ton, regardless of the standard to be applied, against a union 
for breach of the duty of fair representation where that duty has been 
~0dif ied. I~~ However, each statute should be carefully examined for 
purposes of determining the exact wording of the codification and the 
remedies available, if any. Only after such an examination is made c m  one 
tmly opine whether the jurisdiction of the courts is ousted. This approach 
is consistent with the instruction from McLachlin, J. in Weber, supra. 
The analysis adopted by L.D . Barry, J. in Bun v. United Steelworkers 
'36 Supra, note 110. 
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of Amerka et alL3' which appears to have the approval of the Supreme 
Court in Weber, is the preferred approach. In that case Justice Barry 
conducted a very careful analysis of the language of section 126 of the 
Newfoundland Labour Relations  AC^, 1 3 ~  that being the Newfoundland 
codification of the duty of fair representation. Justice Barry considered the 
following factors to be relevant in concluding that the jurisdiction of the 
common law courts was not ousted by S. 126: 
1. Gagnon was not a negligence case and the reference to 
negligence was not necessary for that decision; 
2. conduct falling short of bad faith is not necessarily covered by 
S. 126; 
3.  St. Anne Nackawic is distinguished because the Newfoundland 
Labour Relations Board is not given exclusive jurisdiction over 
" simple negligence" ; 
4. because the Newfoundland Labour Relations Act does not deal 
with "simple" negligence cases it is not a "code governing al1 
aspects of labour relations " . 
'" Supra, note 124; cited with approvai in P a v e  c. ~ s s i o n  des écoles 
catholiques [1997] A.Q. No. 1273 and Déry c. Montréal (Nord) [1997] A.Q. No. 1540. 
13' S.N. 1977, c .  64, as arnended. 
95 
In Bun the court found the union was liable in simple negligence for having 
missed a limitation period. It did not meet its duty to act in a reasonably 
prudent and diligent marner. 
The Nova Scotia courts appear to have adopted an approach similar 
to that taken in New Brunswick and Newfoundland. In Nova Scotiu Union 
of Public Employees, Local 2 v. Kendall et Kendall sued his 
employer and his union seeking retum of insurance premiums improperly 
paid by him. Clearly, the Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the claim 
against the employer given the matter was sornething that could have been 
dealt with through the arbitration process. However, both at trial and in the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the Courts recognized Kendall's right to sue 
his union in negligence. 
The issue of a mernber's right to pursue a clairn based upon "mere 
negligence" was squarely placed before the Court. At trial, Stewart, J. set 
out the union's position: 
"Having undertaken due diligence and acted within 
its jurisdiction as set out in the Constitution, the 
union submits it should not be subject to a claim 
lZ9 Nova Scotia Union of Public Employees, Local 2 v. Kendall, et al (1996) 148 
NSR (2d) 51 (T.D.); (1996) 152 NSR (2d) 76 (C.A.). 
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3 fi140 against it on the basis of 'mere negligence . 
The court rejected that contention and concluded there was no basis 
upon which to limit the union's liability to circumstances of gross 
negligence. 
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision in 
Kendall. However, it did qualify its decision by acknowledging that the 
dispute between the union and Kendall did not arise out of any collective 
agreement with the employer. The policy for which premiums were 
erroneously paid was arranged exclusively by the union. 
Given the development of unionization in the past 50 years, the 
conclusions reached by Creaghan, J. in Duke, Mchtyre, J. in Dutcher and 
Barry, J. in Bun make eminently good sense. In the event the Supreme 
Court of Canada was attempting to limit wrongs for which a member could 
sue his union out of some sense of benevolence toward the trade union 
movement, it was acting upon a misunderstanding of the modem trade 
union. Modem unionisrn benefits fiom sophisticated organization, national 
offices with regional representatives, full or part-time staff, lawyers on 
retainer and organizers who are also paid employees. 
'* Supra, note 139 at 59 (N.S.R.). 
In the event the Supreme Court of Canada was Iabouring under any 
misunderstanding, it is submitted that misunderstanding is fostered in large 
part by the specialized mbunals designed to deal with labour relations. 
Ofrentimes those boards have taken and continue to take a paternalistic 
attitude as it relates to union matters. The attitude that the boards must be 
the keeper and protector of the trade union rnovement is not stated any more 
clearly than in the H a l q  case. Consider, for example, the following excerpt 
from the majority decision: 
"Our view is that in 1978 when Parliament enacted 
the duty of fair representation it must be taken to 
have viewed unions as participatory entities which, 
although vested with exclusive bargaining authority 
for certain units of employees, must aiso act as the 
instruments to foster, preserve, and further the 
laudable purposes expressed in the Preamble. They 
do this in a social and economic context where a 
lack of funding, education, staffing and 
participation is a real, every day fact of life. " 141 
A careful review of the case does not demonstrate any evidence of 
underfunding or lack of staff. Further, there was no evidence called 
demonstrating the degree of volunteerism or democracy in the union. Such 
conclusions made on the basis of misplaced judicial notice form the basis 
upon which the labour boards and some courts seem to have defined the 
14' Supra, note 66 at 509 (C.L.R.B.R.). 
duty of fair representation. To adopt such an approach in the nineties is 
unredistic. 
In the current economic climate, there are few organizations that 
would admit to being adequately financed and adequately staffed. Based 
upon a review of fifieen trade unions operating in the Province of New 
Brunswick, only two used exclusiveIy volunteer help. The other thirteen 
hire professionals whose tasks include organizing, managing collective 
agreements and fihg grievances . 142 
In Haley the Board also suggested that unions are extremely 
democratic. Some may not agree with that suggestion. There is not one 
single jurisdiction in Canada that requires a secret ballot on al1 contract 
offers. Until very recentiy, in New Brunswick at least, two major trade 
unions took the position that members charged with violating the union's 
discipline code could not be represented by the lawyer of their choice. 1s 
'" The following trade unions have paid staff operating within the Province of New 
Brunswick: 1. Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2. Communications Energy & 
Paperworkers' Union; 3. Canadian Auto Workers,4. United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
& Joiners of America, 5. United Association of Plumbers & Pipefitters, 6. Sheet Metal 
Workers' International Association, 7. Labourers' International Union, 8. New 
Brunswick Public Employees Association, 9. Professional Institute of the Public Service, 
10. National Union of Government Employees, 11. International Union of Operating 
Engineers , 12. United S teelworkers ' of America, 13. Teamsters International Union. The 
two unions that relied exclusively upon volunteers were the Fredericton Police 
Association and the Association of New Brunswick Professional Educators. 
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that being extremely democratic? 143 
Another erroneous argument in Haley which the Board uses to justiQ 
imposing a standard of serious or major negligence before a union can be 
found liable for breach of the duty of fair representation is that an employee 
has greater recourse under the Code than he or she did before the courts. 
At page 5 10 (C.L.R.B.R.) the majority in Haley opined: 
"It may be said this result (major negligence 
requirement) is unfair because it leaves the 
individual with no recourse and the union 
unaccountable for its wrong. This is tme but 
overlooks that in the absence of section 136.1 the 
individual had less recourse against the union or 
employer. " 
With respect, the statement that in the absence of section 136.1 (now section 
37) of the Canada Labour Code an individual had less recourse against the 
union is simply not accurate. The courts, possessed of inherent jurisdiction, 
starting with Fisher v. Pemberton and later in Gagnon, were quite prepared 
to recognize a remedy for an aggrieved union member. Given the fiduciary 
nature of the relationship that remedy could include an order that a matter 
proceed to arbitration. We have seen, quite ironicdly, that codification of 
'" See, Wark v. Green, Boaslq and Chnadian Union of Public Employees, Local 
1506 (1985). 66 N.B.R. (2d) 77 (C .A.); and Clark v. PZumbers and Pipefiners Union, 
Local 213 (1988), 89 N.B.R. (2d) 425, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refuseci (1989), 91 
N.B.R. (2d) 90n (S.C.C.). 
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the duty has hindered courts who are attempting to protect union members 
h m  negligent acts of their union executive? 
Finally, even if this latter argument is m e ,  it is of little solace to a 
dismissed employee who has lost the right to grieve his dismissal that 
several years earlier he or she may have been without a remedy. 
There is no doubt that labour board decisions have had a serious 
impact upon the Supreme Court of Canada as it stniggled with the definition 
of the appropriate standard to impose in cases of alleged unfair 
representation. This is understandable given the varying responses of the 
Legislatures and Parliament after the decision in Fisher v. Pemberton. 
I" See, for example, trial decisions in Mulherin and Moldowan, supra, at note 
110. 
Union Duty Of Fair Accommodation 
We have seen in the past quarter of a century the courts and 
legislators develop standards by which unions are requUed to conduct 
themselves . Those standards are variously enforceable before labour 
tribunals and the courts. in addition tu the union's duty toward its members 
flowing fkom labour legislation, fiduciary relationships , neighbourliness 
principles, and contract law, trade unions are also subject to human rights 
legislation that has been implemented in every Canadian jurisdiction. 
Each hurnan rights statute in Canada prohibits a trade union fkom 
discriminating with respect to union membership. Although the protected 
classes Vary from Province to Province, it is generally accepted that a union 
cannot discriminate because of an individual's race, religion, sex, colour, 
et cetera.'" The recent development of the union duty to accommodate 
'" Canadian H u m  Righrs A b ,  R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 S. 9,lO; Individual Righrs' 
Protection A a  R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 S. 10; Hummi Rights Act S.B.C. 1984, c. 22 S. 9;  
Hwuui  Rights Code S.M. 1987-1988 c .  45, S. 14(6); Human Righrs An,  R.S.N.B. 1973 
c. H-11 s.3(3); Human Rights Code, R.S.N. 1990, c. H-14, S. 9(3); Humm, Rights ACT, 
R.S.N.S. 1989 c. 214 S. 9; Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H-19 S. 6; Human 
Rights Acî, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. H-12 c. 8; Saskatchewan Hwnan Rights Co& S . S .  1979 
c. S-24.1 S. 18; Charter of Hurnan Rights and Freedom, R.S.Q. 1977 c.  C-12, S. 17. 
See Appendix B. 
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provides increased statutory protection to union members in all provinces 
and thereby becomes an integral part of the context within which the duty 
of fair representation will continue to develop in the Maritime Provinces. 
W e  employer violations of human rights statutes have been the 
subject of board hearings and court proceedings for many years, it has only 
been recently that unions find thernselves the subject of complaints before 
provincial and federal human rights boards. These complaints are often the 
result of dissatisfaction with the employer's action or lack of action in 
situations where collective agreements entered into by the union and the 
employer have a negative impact upon a phcular  religious or ethnic group 
that is not felt by the majority. What has become known as adverse effect 
discrimination flows from a situation where an employer, presumably with 
the concurrence of the union, makes a mle or s i p  a collective agreement 
in d l  honesty, for sound econornic and business reasons, with absolutely no 
intention to discriminate on the basis of one of the prohibited grounds. 
However, if in the course of implementing or enforcing that d e ,  someone 
protected by a prohibited ground of discrimination is negatively affected, 
that person or group suffers from what has become known as adverse effect 
Where a person is the victim of adverse effect discrimination, the 
human rïghts mbunals have concluded there is a duty to accommodate that 
individual. Any analysis of the duty to accommodate must commence with 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Bhinder and C.N.R. 
Co.14' Bhinder, a practising Sikh, was required by his religious tenets to 
Wear a turban and no other head covering. The employer required he Wear 
a hard hat on the job site where he worked as a maintenance elecmcian. 
When the cornplainant refused to Wear a hard hat, he was dismissed. The 
employer clairned the hard hat mie was a bona jfde occupational 
qualification and there was therefore no discrimination. Bhinder complained 
to the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination by 
reason of his religion. The Commission appointed a human rights tribunal 
which held hearings and concluded that Bhinder shouid be awarded $14,500 
in compensation and reinstated to his position shouid he so desire. 
Canadian National Railway sought judicial review before the Federal 
'" Re Ontario Human Rights CommmLssion and O'Mallq v .  SUnpsonr Sears Ltd. 
(1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 332 (S.C.C.). 
'" (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.). 
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Court of Appeal pursuant to section 28 of the Federd Court AC?.'" The 
Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the requirement that one Wear a 
hard hat while at work was not a discriminatory practice within the meaning 
of the Canadian H14man Rights Act. It held that only intentional 
discrimination is forbidden by the GzIMdim Human Rights Act.'49 The 
Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and concluded that unintentional acts, 
otherwise lawfkl that discriminate agaïnst individuals are violative of the 
Hwnan Rights Act.lS0 Adverse effect discrimination and direct, intentional 
discrimination are both to be guarded against in Canadian society. 
Having found that Canadian National had discriminated against Mr. 
Bhinder, the Supreme Court of Canada then had to deal with Canadian 
National Railway's argument that the wearing of a hard hat was a bona fide 
occupational qualification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the H u m n  Rights 
Act. The majority agreed with the submission by Canadian National and 
concluded as follows: 
". . . if a working condition is established as a 
bona fide occupationai requirement, the 
148 R.S.C. 1970, c.10 (2nd Supp.). 
149 Re C.N.R. and Canadian Human Rights Commission (1983), 147 D.L.R. (3d) 312 
(Fed. C.A.).; overturned, see supra, note 147. 
Supra, note 147 at 501. 
consequential discrimination, if any, is permitted - 
or,probably more accurately - is not considered 
under S. 14(a) as being discriminatory . " 
Because the courts concluded the wearing of a hard hat was a bona 
fide qualification of the work Bhinder was required to do, it did not consider 
the question of whether the employer owed Bhinder a duty to accommodate 
In Bhinder the Supreme Court of Canada could have easily imposed 
a duty of reasonable accommodation upon the employer. The facts strongly 
supported such a conclusion, given the cornplainant could have been 
assigned to other duties as a maintenance elecmcian. Instead, the court 
concluded that where a bona fide occupational qualification is established 
there is no duw to accommodate the employee. This conclusion has been 
criticized by the authors of Ernployment Law In Canada. ls2 As they point 
out, the complainant's duties were not unique, there was an ample supply 
of maintenance electricians and he could have been relocated to a non-hard 
hat area. 
The Bhinder decision contrasts with that of another 1985 decision of 
15' Supra, note 147 at 500. 
'52 England, Christie & Christie, Employm~nr Law in (nnada Butterworths 3rd 
edition Toronto: 1993 at page 5.55. 
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the Supreme Court in O 'Malley v. Simpson Sears Ltd. 153 OyMalley, a 
Seventh Day Adventist, refused to work fiom sunset on Friday until sunset 
on Saturday. Full time clerks were required to work two Saturdays in a row 
in order to have the third off. As a result of OyMalley's refusal, she was 
demoted to the position of part-time clerk which resulted in loss of 
employment benefits. The facts in O'MalZey clearly constituted a case of 
adverse effect discrimination in that no mie was specifically formulated 
which prevented Seventh Day Adventists from obtaining employment or 
working full time. The employer had no malicious motive and there was no 
evidence of direct discrimination. The employer terminated O'Malley's full 
tirne employment and reduced her to part-tirne hours. 
O'Malley brought a cornplaint before the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission alleging discrimination based upon creed contrary to paragraph 
4(1)(g) of the Ontario Human Rights Code I981.lS4 Unlike the case in 
Bhinder, the employer could not allege the shift schedule was a 6ona fide 
occupational qualification since that defense was not then available for 
discrimination based upon creed. 
lS3 (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.). 
'" R.S.O. 1990, C. H-19. 
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As in Bhinder, a board of inquhy held O'Malley was the victim of 
adverse effect discrimination. Furthemore, the Board held the employer had 
a duty of reasonable accommodation to the employee. The Board dismissed 
the cornplaint in concluding the Commission had not established the 
employer acted unreasonably in its efforts to accommodate the employee. 
As in the Federal Court of Appeal in Bhinder, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in O'Malley concluded the Ontario legislation prohibited only 
intentional discrimination. The legislation did not prohibit adverse effect 
discrimination 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the four central issues 
were: 
1.  is unintentional discrimination that adversely 
effects an employee prohibited by the Ontano 
Human Rights Code 1981; 
2. presuming such conduct is discriminatory within 
the language of the Code, is there a duty to 
accommodate the employee; 
3. presuming there is a duty to accommodate, where does the onus 
lie, upon the Commission to prove the failure to accommodate 
or upon the employer to prove it made a reasonable effort to 
accommodate the employee; and 
lS 138 D.L.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. C.A.); overtumed (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 
(S.C.C.). 
4. what is the nature of the duty to accommodare. 
As in the development of the law with respect to the duty of fair 
representation, the Supreme Court of Canada drew upon the American 
experience. Citing with approval the American jurisprudence in Greggs v. 
Duke Power Co.1S6 the Court answered in the affirmative to questions 1 
and 2, supra. 
With respect to the third question raised above, the court concluded 
as follows: 
"Accepting the proposition that there is a duty to 
accommodate imposed on the employer, it 
becomes necessary to put some realistic limit upon 
it. The duty in a case of adverse effect 
discrimination on the basis of religion or creed is 
to take reasonable steps to accommodate the 
complainant, short of undue hardship: in other 
words, to take such steps as may be reasonable to 
accommodate without undue interference in the 
operation of the employer's business and without 
undue expense to the employer. 1r 157 
In its description of adverse effect discrimination, the Supreme Court 
of Canada also offered an interesting comparison between adverse effect 
discrimination and direct discrimination: 
lS6 401 U.S. 424 (1970). 
'" Supra, note 153 at 335. 
"Cases such as this raise a very different issue 
fkom those which rest on direct discrimination. 
Where direct discrimination is shown the employer 
must justiQ the rule, if such a step is possible 
under the enactment in question, or it is struck 
down. Where there is adverse effect discrimination 
on account of creed the offending order or nile 
will not necessarily be smck down. It will survive 
in most cases because its discriminatory effect is 
limited to one person or one group, and it is the 
effect upon them rather than upon the general 
work force which must be considered. In such 
cases there is no question of justification raised 
because the mie, if rationally comected to the 
employment, needs no justification; what is 
required is some measure of accommodation. The 
employer must take reasonable steps toward that 
end which may or may not result in full 
accommodation. Where such reasonable steps, 
however, do not fully reach the desired end, the 
complainant, . . . short of accomrnodating steps on 
his own part . . . must either sacrifice his religious 
principles or his employment. "lS8 
With respect to the fourth question facing the Court in O'Malley, the 
Court concluded the onus is upon the employer to establish what steps, if 
any, were taken to accommodate the employee and, furthemore, at one 
point would additional steps cause "undue hardship" upon the employer. 
Since the employer called no evidence on either issue before the Board 
of Inquiry, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered compensation be paid 
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to Ms. O'Malley. 
While there was never any doubt that the development of the concept 
of adverse effect discrimination in such cases as Bhinder and O'MaIZey 
applied with equal force to trade unions it was not until the decision in 
Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta Human Rights ~ornmission'" that 
the Supreme Court of Canada specifically made reference to trade unionism 
and the fact that the duty to accommodate might include modifications to 
collective agreements. 
In Central Alberta Dairy Pool, an employee, Mr. Christie, became a 
member of the Worldwide Church of God. His religion forbade him fmm 
working on the Sabbath and other holy days, including Easter Monday. 
Although the employer had taken some steps to accommodate Mr. Christie 
in the past, that was not possible on Mondays given the onerous operational 
requirements of that day of the week. The employer advised Mr. Christie 
to attend work on Easter Monday or he would be fired. The employee failed 
to attend work and was terminated. lm 
Mr. Christie filed a cornplaint pursuant to ss. 7(1) of the Individual's 
- -- - 
'" [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489. 
There was some debate about whether Mr. Christie was a baptized follower of 
his faith. However. that debate is not relevant for purposes of this paper. 
11 1 
Rights Protectrgon AC^'^' before the Alberta Human Rights Commission. 
The Board of Inquiry concluded Christie was the victim of adverse effect 
discrimination, which conduct was not saved by the bom fide occupational 
qualification defence. In both the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench16' and 
the Alberta Court of AppeallQ the courts concluded that regular attendance 
at the place of employment was a bow fide occupational qualification 
pursuant to subsection 7(3) of the Act and overturned the Board of Inquiry. 
In the Supreme Court of Canada as in the courts below, taking the 
opportunity provided by Bhinder, the employer argued that the requirement 
to work on Easter Monday was a bonafide occupational qualification. It 
argued the courts were thereby precluded from considering whether the 
employer had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the employee. The 
employer argued, relying upon Bhinder, that given the establishment of a 
bonafide occupational qualification there was no duty to accommodate the 
employee. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, disagreed and 
reversed, in part, its decision in Bhinder. Madame Justice Wilson, speaking 
for the majority, concluded that the duty to accommodate exists whether or 
- 
16' Supra, note 145. 
la (1986), 45 Alm. L.R. (2d) 325 (Q.B.). 
[1989] 1 W.W.R. 78 (A1ta.C.A.). 
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not a bonafide occupational qualification has been established in cases of 
adverse effect discrimination. However, no such duty arises in cases of 
direct discrimination. 
In other words, an employer may deliberately discriminate against an 
employee, successfully raise the bonafide occupational qualification defence 
and have no duty to accommodate the affected ernployee. However, the 
same employer who inadvertently discriminates against an empioyee and 
successfully raises the bom jide occupational defence does have a duty to 
accommodate. Ironically, the duty to accommodate arises where there is 
adverse effect discrimination and not direct and deliberate discrimination. 
Any question of compensation to those effected by direct discrimination ends 
with the conclusion there exists a bona fide occupational qualification. 
The Central Albem Dairy Pool decision is of extreme importance to 
the trade union movement given another conclusion made by Madame 
Justice Wilson. There, she attempts to define the extent to which parties 
(employers and trade unions) to collective agreements must accommodate 
employees adversely affected by an employer d e ,  whether or not a bom 
fide occupational qualification is established. Iudge Wilson concludes that 
IM Supra, note 159. 
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the duty to accommodate extends to the point of creating hardship, albeit not 
undue hardship. Some factors to be considered in determining whether or 
not there is undue hardship are the following: 
"the financial costs to the firm, the magnitude of 
any safety risks, the demee to which collective 
agreements would be dismpted. the impact on the 
morale of emplo~ees, and the interchangeability of 
the work force and other facilities. (emphasis 
added) 
hterestingly, the rnajority were quite willing to hypothesize about adjusting 
the terms of collective agreements but were unwilling to provide specifics 
concerning the extent to which employers and trade unions will be expected 
to go in accommodating employees. 
With respect, the approach adopted by Sopinka, J .  writing for the 
dissent in Central Alberta Dairy Pool is the preferred one. He noted there 
is no distinction in Canadian human rights legislation between direct and 
indirect (or adverse effect) discrimination. That is, discrimination is 
discrimination, without qualification or distinction. Any question of a duty 
to accommodate could therefore be subsumecl into a determination of 
whether or not a bona fide occupational qualification is established. 
As the law currently exists, regardless of whether or not a bonafide 
165 Note 159 at 521. 
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occupational qualification is established, a trade union can find itself jointly 
liable with an employer if it does not make sufficient effort to accommodate 
an employee adversely affected by the terms of a collective agreement. This 
was the situation faced by the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 
573 in Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud.166 Renaud is 
effectively the first decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to address a 
trade union's duty to accommodate, the extent to which it is expected to 
accommodate and the implications of accommodation upon free collective 
bargaining . 
In Renaud, the Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to 
address the issue of the duty to accommodate arising from operation of the 
British Columbia Human Rights Act!' It is also the first Canadian case 
to deal specifically with a union's duty to accommodate. 
Renaud's religious beliefs forbade him from working from sundown 
on Friday night to sundown Saturday. He applied for and was successfbl in 
obtaining a position at Spring Valley Elementary School where he was 
required to work the 3 p.m. to 1 1 p.m. shift Monday to Friday . Renaud and 
16' [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970. 
16' S.B.C. 1984 C. 22. 
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his pastor went to see the employer immediately after Renaud learned he had 
been successful in his job application. The employer agreed to accommodate 
Renaud's request and was willing to alter the Friday evening shift. Such an 
alteration, however, would have been in clear contradiction to the rems of 
the collective agreement entered into between the employer and the union. 
At a meeting of the trade union, it was agreed that a policy grievance would 
be filed should the employer place any employee on a Sunday to Thursday 
shift. 
Faced with opposition from the union, the employer left the shift 
scheduie intact. The employer tenninated Renaud when he failed to attend 
work on Fnday evening. 
Renaud filed a cornplaint against both the employer and the union with 
the British Columbia Council of Human Rights who upheld the cornplaint 
and ordered Renaud be reinstated and paid compensation. The employer and 
the union both sought judicial review. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, relying upon Bhinder, agreed with the lower court's ruling that the 
requirement to work the Friday shift from 3 p.m. - 1 1 p.m. was a bona fide 
occupational qualification and rejected the appeal. 
Mr. Justice Sopinka clearly stated the issues and the potential 
implications of any decision the Court might make in the opening paragraph 
of his judgment. He cautioned as follows: 
"The issue raised in this appeal is the scope and 
content of the duty of an employer to 
accommodate the religious beliefs of employees 
and whether and to what extent that duty is shared 
by a cade union. While this duty has been 
recognized and discussed as it relates to employers 
. . . little judicid consideration has been given to 
the question raised by the involvement of a 
collective agreement and a cemfied trade union. 
1s a trade union liable for discrimination if it 
refuses to relax the provisions of a collective 
agreement and thereby blocks the employer's 
attempt to accommodate? Must the employer act 
unilaterally in these circumstances? These are 
issues that have serious im~lications for the 
unionized workplace. " (emphasis added) 
Applying its decision in Central Alberta Dairy Pool, the court defined 
the duty resting on an employer as requiring measures short of undue 
hardship. Rather than define the duty in positive terms, the Court applied 
a negative definition. "Short of undue hardship" imports a limitation on the 
employer's obligation so that measures that occasion undue interference with 
the employer's business or undue expense are not required. Undue 
interference and undue expense are issues of fact to be deterrnined by the 
trier of fact. 
- - 
'" Supra, note 166 at 975. 
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Although no definition of undue interference and undue expense is 
proffered by the Court it does clearly reject the definition adopted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Tram World Airlines Inc. v. 
Hardisen. 16' 
That test holds that where an employer is required to incur more than 
minimal cos6 then an undue hardship is incurred. The "de minimus" test 
espoused by Hardisen was rejected in both O'MalZey and R e ~ u d .  
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the de minimus test would 
virtually remove any duty to accommodate. As a result of the decision in 
Renaud there are at least three components to the duty to accommodate in 
Canada: 
1. more than negligible effort is required to satisQ the duty; 
2. sornething less than undue hardship is required; 
3. the employer and the union must go to "reasonable" efforts to 
accommodate and in each case "reasonableness" is a question 
of fact that will vary in the circumstances. 
Significat about the Renaud decision is the fact that by and of itself, the 
potential breach of a C O ~ C ~ V ~  agreement does not constitute undue 
- - - - - - 
'" 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
i l 8  
hardship. It is no defense to a claim of adverse effect discrimination that 
the union and the employer were ad idem with respect to the terms of a 
collective agreement and that the employer feared the filing of a grievance 
if it did accommodate the complainant. 
What does this mean to the made union movement? A union can be 
liable for discriminatory conduct in one of two ways. Firstly, if it 
participates in the formulation of the discriminatory rule, and, secondly, if 
it impedes the employer in efforts to accommodate the aggrieved employee. 
The defence of bona fide occupational requirement can be raised by the 
employer but is unavailable to the union. This poses special problems for 
a made union against whom an accusation of discriminatory conduct has 
been made. 
At least one autl~or''~ has suggested placing such liability upon a 
union is unfair given that it is a fiction (as stated in Renaud) that in 
Collective agreements "al1 provisions are formulated jointly by the 
parties."171 It has been suggested that there is not a joint formulation of 
provisions because employers control the capital, control the place of work 
''O Michael Lynch and Richard Eilis, Unions and the D w  to Accommodate, I Can. 
Lab. Law Journal 238. 
17' (1992) 92 CLLC 17032 at page 16,258. 
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and benefit nom strongly worded management rïghts clauses. ln 
One cannot fault the conclusion made by the Supreme Court of 
Canada that unions and employers should not be able to effectively contract 
out of human rights obligations. Otherwise the end result could be human 
rights violations justified by agreement of the parties which would bring us 
full circle to the railway cases referred to earlier in this paper.ln 
It is, however, respectfùlly submined that for purposes of the remedy 
available no distinction should be made between direct discrimination and 
adverse effect discrimination. In a multi-cultural society such as Canada it 
is becorning increasingly difficult to direct one's rnind to al1 the possible 
unintended adverse effects that might flow from the language of a collective 
agreement. 
The duty to accommodate as it has developed should be collapsed into 
a determination of whether or not a bonajide occupational requirement has 
been established. This, regardless of whether the discrimination is direct or 
indirect. Assurning such a requirement has been established, there is no need 
for any M e r  investigation. Assuming it has not, it follows there is liability 
- - -  
ln Supra, note 170. 
See. supra, notes 1 aad 7. 
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upon any party responsible for the discrimination, regardless of whether it 
is the employer or the union. Whiie the efforts of the courts to be fair and 
just to al1 concemed is laudable, the recent applications of the duty to 
accommodate ignore the reality of Canadian society. 
In many parts of Canada today employers could spend more time and 
money accommodating the diverse interests of the work force than otherwise 
managing the enterprise. 
Life for the vast majority of Canadians must continue relatively 
unimpeded by the extreme religious views of fellow Canadians. Perhaps 
father's week-end visit with his child on a Saturday is just as important a 
value to foster as the religious custom of a Seventh Day Adventist, Baptist, 
Catholic, Jew, Muslim et cetera. Perhaps an employer's desire to ensure 
safety in the work place is just as important a value to foster as someone's 
right to Wear the religious attire he or she feels obIiged to Wear. Perhaps 
a mother's desire to be with her children during their Mach  break, to which 
she is entitied because of seniority, is a value worth fostering that is no less 
important that someone's desire to attend Easter services but who does not 
yet have the requisite seniority to have the day off. These are value 
judgments unions and employers are quite capable of deciding without 
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excessive interference fiom human rights tribunals. 
The development of the union duty to accommodate is the result of 
what I refer to as administrative tribunal law making. 
Human rights aibunals and the Courts appear to have given life to a 
concept never contemplated by the Legislator. Will Canadian law continue 
to develop in this direction? Will administrative mbunals continue to 
exercise the influence and power demonstrateci in the study of the duty to 
accommodate? These are questions that are extremely difficult to answer. 
Furthemore, a proper anaiysis of those issues would no doubt constitute a 
thesis in and of itself. 
However, the issues raised in this thesis, including the apparent 
willingness of the courts to accept ouster of their jurisdiction and the method 
by which an onerous duty to accommodate has developed, have led to the 
development of the next chapter . 
Given some of the judicial pronouncements discussed, infia, it is my 
view human rights tribunals and labour relations boards can look forward 
to more, rather than less, judicial and legislative control. 
Judicial Development of Unions' Duties Strengthened: 
A Check on the Power of Labour Tribun* 
We have seen the courts' willingness to conclude ouster of their 
jurisdiction in cases where there was no explicit instruction from the 
Legislator. We have also observeci the courts gram to human rights tribunals 
a certain "inherent" jurisdiction under the guise of statutory interpretation. 
The result has been a tremendous opportunity for administrative tribunal law 
making. 
Unlike the duty of fair representation, the duty to accommodate was 
not a judicial creation. However, the judiciary gave it life by endorsing it 
and accepting that human rights tribunal had the cornpetence to create such 
a concept even in the absence of specific legislative a~th0rity.l'~ It no 
doubt seerned a reiatively minor extension of the mbunai created concept of 
adverse effect discrimination. Note, however, there is no legislative 
authority that adverse effect discrimination is even "discrimination" as 
contemplated by the various human rights statutes. Like the duty to 
accommodate this too is an example of administrative tribunal law making. 
'" See, Bhinder, supra, note 147. 
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It is submitted the confidence displayed by such tribunals in "making law" 
cm be attributed to three distinct and recent developments in Canadian law: 
1. the degree of curial deference afforded tribunals when acting 
within the scope of their jwisdiction. 
2. decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that pennit mbunals 
to determine the constitutionality of statutory provisions under 
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, '" 
3. decisions of the courts concluding its jurisdiction had been 
ousted without very clear language to that effect. The best 
example of this is to be found in the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal decision in Maldowan. 
It would appear that courts in New B m w i c k  have been the most 
vigilant in ensuring their jurïsdiction is not ousted expect by clear and 
unequivocal instruction from the Legislature. 17' 
In the preceding chapters 1 have demonstrated how the union duty of 
fair representation, once transplantecl to Canadian soil, quickly evolved and 
advanced even further than Amencan jurisprudence in protecting union 
members from wrongs committed by the executive. Canadian judicial 
development of the duty has, however, been slowed by codification in most 
17.' Cd@ Chich Ltd. v. Omri0 (Labour Relations Board) (199 1). 8 1 D. L. R. (4th) 
121 (S.C.C.). 119911 2 S.C.R. 5; Teireauil-Gadoury v. Guiada (Ernployment & 
Immigration Commission) (1991). 81 D.L.R. (4th) 358 (S.C.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22; 
Douglas/Kwantien Faculty Association v . Douglas College ( IWO), 77 D . L. R. (4th) 94 
(S.C.C.).  
'" See, for example, supra, notes 119. 120. 
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provinces and the federal jurisdiction as well as by increased protection to 
union members under human rights legislation. Judicial development of the 
duty, even if the Maritime Provinces, was recently threatened by efforts of 
the New Brunswick Labour and Employment Board to assume jurisdiction 
over allegations of unfair representation even in the absence of 
codification. 
Although the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act contains no 
codification of the union duty of fair representation. It does however, 
contain a provision specifically requiring that accredited employer 
organizations fairly represent d l  employers bound by an accreditation 
order.'" Until the recent decision of the New Brunswick Labour and 
Employment Board in Laviolette v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of Amerka, Local 1023178 New Brunswick practitioners had clear 
direction from the Court that its jurisdiction had not been subsumed by the 
Labour and Employment Board. 
However, in Laviolene, Kuttner, Vice Chair of the Labour and 
Employment Board attempted to clothe the Board with jurisdiction in rnatters 
ln R.S.N.B. c.14 ss. 51(1). 
'" (1997), 97 C.L.L.C. 220-027 at 143. 306 (N.B. Lab. & Emp. Bd.). 
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involving alleged breaches of the union duty of fair representation. 
The facts in La Violerte were relatively straightforward. LaViolette, a 
carpenter by trade, received assignments based upon referrais from his 
union, otherwise known as a hiring hall. On May 13, 1996 LaViolette 
received a referral to attend work at Dalhousie, New Brunswick for On-Site 
Mechanical Ltd. When he was laid off some five days later he complained 
that relatives of the business manager were still working. He alleged he was 
not being treated fairly by his union. Mr. LaViolette filed a grievance with 
the employer. That grievance was resolved to the satisfaction of the 
employer and the union but not to Laviolette's satisfaction. LaViolette then 
filed an interna1 union complaint which, once again, was not resolved to his 
satisfaction. He then filed a complaint before the New Brunswick Labour 
and Employment Board alleging a violation of section S(2) of the Industriai 
Relahom Act. That section, one of several setting out union unfair labour 
practices, provides as follows: 
5(2) No trade union or council of trade unions, 
and no person acting on behalf of a trade union or 
council of trade unions, shall seek by intimidation, 
by coercion, by the threat of dismissal or loss of 
employment, by the imposition of a pecuniary or 
other penalty, by undue influence or by any other 
means, to compel or to induce an employee or 
other person to become or to refrain from 
becoming, or to cease to be, a member or officer 
of a trade union or council of trade unions, or to 
deprive an employee or other person of his rights 
under this Act. " 
The trade union objected to the jurisdiction of the Labour and Employment 
Board to hear Laviolette's complaint. 
The issue was fiamed by Vice Chair Kuttner in the following terms: 
"Does the Labour and Employment Board have 
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint under section 
106(1) of the Industrial Relations Act that a trade 
union which holds bargaining rights pursuant to 
the Act has breached its duty of fair representation 
owed to employees in the bargaining unit for 
which its acts as bargaining agent?" and secondly, 
"whether the terms of the Act are sufficiently 
capacious to embrace the duty of fair 
representation is the very matter now before us for 
determination. " 17' 
Vice Chairman Kuttner answered the questions in the positive. He dismissed 
Justice McIntyre's observation in Dutcher that "the common law applies and 
recourse may be had to this by stating the court was "merely 
observing that the Act lacks explicit statutory language imposing a duty of 
fair representation. " 181 
179 Supra, note 178 at 143,307. 
Note 120 at 379. 
Note 178 at 143,308. 
In the absence of explicit statutory language and in the face of clear 
pronouncements from the New Brunswick courts that it had jurisdiction in 
matters involving alleged unfair representation, how then did Vice Chairman 
Kutmer conclude he had jwisdiction? With respect, by clothing himself with 
the powers of a federally appointed judge. This was accomplished by 
carefully and selectively applying decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 
that failed to acknowledge administrative tribunals (particularly labour 
tribunals) are part of the executive branch of govemment and thereby 
treating them as if they were federaily appointed judges possessed of 
inherent jurisdiction. 
Consider for example the reasoning of Vice Chair Kumier: 
1 .  firstly, he took cognizance of the fact that L'Heureux-Dubé in 
Gendron had concluded that the "cornmon law and statutory 
codifications [p 13191 had the sarne content." 1 have already 
indicated that erroneous statement has hindered appropriate 
assessrnent of the issues in the Provinces. The case of 
Maldowan is the best example. 
2. secondly, he relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Royal Oak Mines hc .  v. GznadcL (Labour Relations 
Board)la2 where the court concluded a labour tribunal could 
impose a coliective agreement upon the parties as part of its 
remedial power in the absence of explicit language in the 
statute. And, significantly, in the face of specific language 
ln (1996) 133 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.). 
authorizing such a procedure for first agreements. lg3 
3. thirdly, he relies upon what he refers to as the "judicial 
preference for the resolution of work place disputes before 
specialized mbunals. " In doing so he cites St. Anne Nackawic 
Pu@ & Paper Co, O 'Leary, and Weber. '" 
4. fourthly, he relies upon the interpretative role mbunals may 
now play given the existence of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. He States: 
"Through constant exposure to a climate sufised 
with constitutional values, mbunals become ever 
more sensitized to them and, by a process almost 
spontaneous, refine legislative values to the rigours 
of that climate. In this way, constitutional noms 
are breathed into legislative ones in the ordinary 
process of the interpretation of enabling legislation 
by tribunals such as ours. rr 185 
5 .  finally, he makes reference to the broad protection fmm review 
afforded by Canadian Union of Public Employees and New 
Brunswick Liquor Corporuti~n.'~~ He refers to this case as the 
cornerstone in the "consistent trend in modem jurisprudence to 
emphasize the peculiar strength of labour mbunals as the 
preferred instnimentality for the resolution of work place 
disputes arising within the context of labour legislation. 11 187 
While concluding the Labour and Employment Board did have 
'" See, sub-sections 80(1) and 99(2) of Carta.& Labour O d e .  
Supra, note 178 at 143,314. 
lg5 Supra. note 178 at 143, 3 13. 
(WZJ), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.). 
'" Supra, note 178 at 143, 314. 
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jurisdiction to hear the complaint, by separate decision rendered May 7, 
1997 the complaint was dismissed. 
The Laviolette matter came on for judicial review before Deschênes, 
His Lurdship concluded the standard of review was one of patent 
unreasonableness although he did consider, whether, given the jurisdictional 
nature of the question posed, it might be appropriate to apply a correctness 
standard. 
Even applying the patently unreasonable standard for review the 
leamed mal judge concluded the Labour and Employment Board's decision 
should be removed into the superior court and quashed. The basis for his 
decision included, infer dia, the following: 
1. the plain meaning of subsection 5(2) of the Industrial Relations 
AC?; lgl 
2. the fact the Legislahue had specifically provided for a duty of 
fair representation toward employers of an accredited 
employer's organization (S. 51(1) of the Act)lg2 and had 
Unreported decision dateci May 7, 1997, N.B. Labour & Ernployment Board, 
Vice Chairman Kuttner. 
la9 United Brotherhoud of Carpemers & Joiners of America. Local 1023 et al. and 
Lionel Luvene, et al. (1997), 98 C.L.L.C. 220414 at 143,116 (N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.). 
Ig1 Supra, note 189 at 143,122. 
Ig2 Supra, note 189 at 143,123. 
chosen not to do so for employees. 
3. the fact the Board ignorai the comments of "three different 
courts to the effect that the legislature in our Province has not 
codified the union duty of fair representation. " 193 
Ln Laviolette, the issue of most serious import was much broader than 
whether or not the cornplainant had a right of redress before the courts or 
an administrative tribunal. The most serious question concerneci the 
paramountcy of Parliament. That issue was brought clearly into focus by 
Deschênes, J. on several occasions in the course of rendering his judgment. 
He stated: 
"Although 1 share the views expressed by the 
Board that Labour tribunals should probably be 
considered as the " preferred instnimentality "or 
the resolution of such disputes, such decisions 
belong to the legislature and not to the judiciary or 
labour tribunals. " lg4 
"In my opinion, the New Brunswick legislature 
has, for whatever reason, chosen not to enact a 
provision codiQing the union duty of fair 
representation and to imply such a duty . . . 
cannot be rationally supported by the relevant 
legislation. " Ig5 
lg3 Ibid. Here his Lordship refers to Dutcher, supra, note 120; Hedges v. CaMdan 
Auto Works(1997), 97 C.L.L.C. 220-023 (P.E.I.S.C.)(T.D.)andLecï.irv. S.A.T.A.P.. 
Local 4 (1989), 103 N.B.R. (2d) 43 (Q.B.D.) .  
'% Supra, note 189 at 143, 123. 
Ig5 ibid. 
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The Labour and Emplopent Board appealed the matter to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appea1.I" The Court of AppeaI concluded the whole 
issue then before it was moot. The Labour and Employment Board had 
dismissed the complaint. Laviolette took no interest in the issue then before 
the Court. The employer took no interest in the issue. Since the trade union 
had obtained the remedy it was seeking before the Board (dismissal of the 
complaint), it ~ O O ,  according to the Court of Appeal, had no "lis" with any 
other proper party before the Court of Appeal. 
However, after concluding the issue was moot and Deschênes, J. 
therefore had no jurisdiction to render the decision he did, the Court, clearly 
in obiter, did indicate its agreement with the conclusions reached by 
Deschênes, J., assuming the matter had been properly before him. 
As was the case in St. Anne NacKawic and O'Leary, we see the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal once again showing preference toward the courts 
and the Legislatue over an expanded role for statutory tribunals. 
Two recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada show an 
increased sensitivity toward the courts' own jurisdiction and the role of the 
Legislator . Those decisions, Brotherhood of Mainienance and Way 
Lmiolette v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Amenca. Local 1023 
Q.L. Ref: 119981 N.B.J. No. 130 (C.A.). 
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Empluyees and Canadian Pacifc Lrd.lW and Bell v. Canada ( H m n  
Rights ~ o m m i s s i o n ) ~ ~ ~  may well signal a change in amtude by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The result may be a more cautious approach to the role 
to be played by administrative mbunals in our democracy. 
While this paper is not intended to be a critique of the current trends 
in judicial review, this study of the evolution of the duty of fair 
representation and the duty to accommodate has demonstrated to me how 
quickly some administrative mbunals, with the full complicity of the 
Supreme Court of Canada build upon their own decisions and those of the 
Supreme Court to continually expand their influence. As that influence 
expands, the Legislator becomes an ignored parmer in the governing 
process. 
Those concerns are much better articulated by Larner, C .J-C. in Bell. 
The facts in Bell and its cornpanion case, Cooper v. Canadian Human Rights 
Commissionig9 concemed allegations of age discrimination. Two airline 
pilots who were forced to retire at age 60 brought cornplaints of age 
discrimination before the Canadiari Human Rights Commission pursuant to 
'" (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.). 
lg8 (1996) 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). 
(1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). 
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the Canadian Hwnan Righrs A ~ . ~ O O  The Commission dismissed the 
cornplaints and refusai to appoint a mbunai. The retirernent was not 
discriminatory because the pilots had reached the normal retirement age and 
furthemore, if there was discrimination, it was justified under section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Righrs and Freedoms. Applications for judicial 
review were not successful. Furthemore, in the Federal Court of 
Appep l  Marceau, J. concluded neither the Commission nor a mbunal 
appointed by it had the power to determine the constitutionality of its 
enabling statute. 
In the Supreme Court of Canada the majority judgment was written 
by La Forest, J. (Sopinka, Gonthier and Iacobucci, JJ. concurring) . Lamer, 
C. J-C. wrote his own judgment in which he concurred with the conclusion 
reached by La Forest, J. Their Ladyships McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dubé 
concurred in their dissent from the major@. 
The issue facing the Supreme Court in Bell was whether the Human 
Rights Commission had the power to determine the constitutionality of its 
enabling statute. 
R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6. 
20' (1994), 94 C.L.L.C. 17,032 (Fed. C.A.). 
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The disquiet of the Chief Justice is evident in the opening remarks of 
his judgment: 
"Although my colleagues disagree on the outcome 
of these appeals, bey nevertheless agree on the 
governing legai proposition: that mbunals which 
have jurisdiction over the general law, have 
jurisdiction to refuse to apply - and have 
effectively to render inoperative - laws that they 
find to be unconstitutional, since through the 
operation of s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the 
constitution is the supreme law of Canada. 1 agree 
with them that this proposition emerges from 
previous decisions of this Court and that it binds 
us today . However, 1 hope that a full bench of this 
Court will eventually be afforded the opportunity 
to revisit this proposition." 
His Lordship urges his brother and sister judges to senously consider 
how their previous decisions in Cuddy Chi& Ltd. v. Ontano Labour 
Relations Board, Tetreault-Godoury v . Canada (Employment and 
Immigraîion, and Douglas/Kw&en Fuculty Association v. Douglas College 
have, in effect, resulted in the tail wagging the dog. 
In the mlogy of cases referred to by Lamer, C.J.C. the Supreme 
Court of Canada had concluded that administrative tribunals, possessed of 
no inherent jurisdiction, could declare laws inoperative and refuse to apply 
them. While a tribunal could not declare a law invalid, the distinction 
between invalidity and inoperability, is not one that would be appreciated by 
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the average person on the Street or for that matter, the average person's 
representative who was entrusted to enact the law. 
It is that power, apparently bestowed upon tribunals by the Courts, 
and not devolved by the Legislator that now troubles the Chief Justice. In 
a very thoughtful anaiysis, he urges a reconsideration of the broad powers 
afforded by the Courts to administrative tribunals. 
He bases his argument upon two centrai themes. Firstly, given the 
role of the courts to superintend the Legislator and make decisions 
concerning the validity or invalidity of laws, no body other than courts of 
inherent jurisdiction shouid exercise that function. 1 wholeheartedly agree. 
Before the advent of the Charter, when the vast majority of constitutional 
cases were decided based upon the division of powers, it would have been 
highly irregular for a tribunal, being a part of the executive branch of 
government, to proclaim laws inoperative because they encroached upon the 
powers of another level of govemment. 
The second basis upon which the Chief Justice relies in urging a 
reconsideration of the powers afforded to tribmals is rooted in the concept 
of Parliamenmy democracy. He States that one of the aspects of 
Parliamentary democracy is the legal relationship between the executive 
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branch and the legislative branch. Centrai to that relationship is that the 
executive must implement policies approved and enacted by the legislature. 
if the executive branch, qua, administrative tribunal, possesses the power 
to render inoperative laws enacted by its Creator, where then is to be found 
the principle of Parliamentary democracy? I would hesitate to use the word 
Creator to describe the relationship between the legislature and an 
administrative tribunal if it (the mbunal) was possessed of some, albeit 
minor, inherent jurisdiction. I know of none. 
The Chicf Justice is quick to point out that his approach does not in 
any way limit the use of the Charter by tribunals as they seek to interpret 
enactments they are to presume are constitutionally valid. 
It is this expressed desire to rein in administrative tribunals that might 
in the future lirnit the Supreme Court's willingness to presume ouster of its 
jurisdiction where none is explicitly stated; equate its own jurisdiction in 
fields of negligence with a codification of some similarity but lacking 
exactitude; and finally, permit the creation by administrative tribunals of 
duties such as the duty to accommodate when no statutory basis for such a 
duty exists. 
The second case that indicates the Courts might be more willing in the 
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future to assert their distinctiveness from administrative tribunals is that of 
Brotherhood of Maintetuznce and Way Employees. The employer sought to 
change its employees' work schedule from 10 days on and 4 days off to 5 
days on and 2 days off. The union grieved pursuant to the collective 
agreement then in force. While awaiting the arbitration ruling the union 
sought and obtained an interim injunction from the British Columbia 
Supreme Court to prevent the employer from implementing the new work 
schedule. The employer's appeals to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court of Canada failed. It is interesthg to note that al1 nine 
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada sat on the appeal, and al1 nine 
justices concurred. Only one judgment was rendered. 
Why was leave granted? When one considers that four justices of the 
British Columbia court (one trial judge and three appellate judges) were 
apparently of one mind and the only cases cited of significance by the full 
bench of the Supreme Court of Canada were St. Anne Nackawic, Weber and 
O'Leav it is this author's view the Supreme Court wanted to qualiQ 
somewhat the impressions lefi in earlier decisions that it considered itself 
ousted from a consideration of labour matters unrelated to wildcat strikes. 
Relying upon those same three cases the Supreme Court could have just as 
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easily concluded the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted, the interim 
injunction was made without jurisdiction, and it should thereby be lifted. 
The GnadcL hbour Code, the legislation at issue in Brotherhood of 
Maintenunce and Wq Empluyees contained a clause virtually identical to 
section 55 of the New Bninswick Industrial Relations Act that was 
considered in St. Anne Nackawic and O ' ~ e a r y . ~ ~  Every collective 
agreement was to contain a clause providing for the final settlement of 
differences between the parties or employees bound by the agreement. 
The contract was in Ml force. 
There was a standard management rights clause that granted the 
employer the right to manage its work force. 
The Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged there is a general rule 
in labour relations that employees "obey now, grieve later. 19 203 
Relying upon its residual discretionary power to grant relief not 
available under the statutory scheme the Court concluded the injunction was 
a valid exercise of discretion by the lower court. With respect, nothing 
under the statutory scheme prevented the employer and the union from 
Un R.S.C. 1985, C. L-2, S. 57(1). 
Supra, note 197 at 294. This principle was approved by the Court in Keiso v. The 
Queen. [1981] 2 S.C.R. 199; 120 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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agreeing to dispense with the "obey now, grieve later" mie. Furthermore, 
nothing prevented the employer and the union Born agreeing that an 
arbitrator properly seized with a grievance could rnake appropriate interim 
orders . 
Given these recent judgments from the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal and the Suprerne Court of Canada it would appear that in New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Rince Edward Island the courts will continue, 
unimpeded by labour tnbunals, to develop standards unions are expected to 
meet when dealing with their members. 
CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion & Summary 
The genesis of the duty of fair representation is a classic example of 
the common law approach to the resolution of problems arising between 
individuals in our society in those circumstances where the Legislator had 
not specifically provided a remedy. 
In a similar fashion, human rights aibunais have employed the same 
common law approach to develop the duty of reasonable accommodation. 
With respect, given that those tribunals were not judges possessed of 
inherent jurisdiction the constitutional basis of the duty to accommodate is 
suspect. No doubt Lamer, C.J.C.3 desire to revisit the role of tribunals in 
interpreting the Charter would include a reevaluation of administrative law 
making in general. 
Without question, the current state of the law in Canada concerning 
a union's responsibility toward its members is a collection of differing 
statutes, interpretations of those statutes, and differing applications of 
cornmon law principles . 
In those Provinces where the duty of fair representation has not been 
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codified, complaints about a union's conduct in the collective bargaining or 
rights determination process will no doubt be subjected to a standard of 
ordinary negligence. In Provinces where the duty has been codified, except 
in cases where statutory language declares a different standard, tribunals will 
no doubt continue to apply the gross negligence standard. 
Whether or not the duty has been codified, it seems actions founded 
in simple negligence survive where the union's conduct is unrelateci to the 
collective bargaining process or grievance arbitration. For example, where 
it undertakes to implement its own health plan and negligently allocates 
While the gross negligence test might be the proper standard by which 
to measure a union's conduct at the negotiating table, it is submitted a 
simple negligence standard is appropriate for the determination of rights 
under the collective agreement, especidly where matters of discipline and 
termination are involved. 
The Legislatures and Parliament, have, by their enactments, or lack 
of legislative control, made policy decisions about the duty of unions toward 
their membership. In those circumstances where the Legislator has chosen 
not to act we have seen efforts by tribunals to N1 the perceived void. As a 
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result, particularly in the case of the duty to accommodate we have seen the 
courts permit mbunals to be the crafters of legislation as well as arbiters of 
its impact. This author senously doubts whether the Legislator intended 
mbunals to exercise such wide powers. 
It is appropriate to close by posing the following question with respect 
to the interplay between human rights developments and the duty of fair 
representation. What role, if any, does the courts' approval of the concept 
of unintentional (adverse effect) discrimination have upon the "non- 
discrimination" component of the duty of fair representation? In the past that 
component was only violated if the union was guiity of intentional 
discrimination. The " arbitrary" component of the test caught unintentional 
conduct. Has the test been dramaticaily altered by recent interpretations of 
human rights legislation? That issue has yet to be addressed by the courts. 





Canada Labour Code 
R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 as amended 
Sec. 37 A trade union or representative of a trade union that is the 
bargaining agent for a bargaining unit shall not act in a rnanner 
that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in the 
representation of any of the employees in the unit with respect 
to their rights under the collective agreement that is applicable 
to them. 
Newfoundland Labour Relations Act 
R.S.N. 1990, c. L-1 as amended 
Sec. 130 (1) An employee in a bargaining unit, who claims to be 
aggrieved because his or her bargaining agent has failed to act 
in good faith, in the handling of a grievance that he or she has 
filed with that bargaining agent in accordance with a procedure 
(a) that has been established by the bargaining agent; 
and 
(b) to which the employee has not been given ready 
access, 
may make a written complaint to the board. 
(2) A complaint made under subsection (1) shall be made 
within 90 days from the date on which the grievance first arose. 
(3) The board shdl  investigate a complaint made to it under 
subsection (1) and detexmine whether there was a failure by the 
bargaining agent to act in good fa& 
(4) A provision in this Act or a collective agreement that 
limits the t h e  in which a grievance or arbitration proceeding 
shall begin or a decision made does not apply where a matter 
is referred to the board under this section. 
(5)  Where, on investigation of a cornplaint in accordance 
with subsection (3), the board h d s  that there was a failwe to 
act in good faith by the bargaining agent concerned, the board 
shall direct that bargaining agent to take those steps that the 
board thiab appropriate in the circumstances. 
(6) Where a collective agreement expires before a compla.int 
is made to the board under subsection (1), or where a collective 
agreement expires before the board completes its investigation, 
the board may order the bargaining agent to compensate the 
employee to a reasonable extent that the board may prescribe. 
Nova Scotia 




Trade Union Act 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475 as amended 
Labour Act 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-1 as amended 
Industrial Relations Act 
R.S.N.B. 1973, C. 1-4 
Labour Code 
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-27 as amended 
A certified association shall not act in bad faith or in an 
arhitrary or discriminatory rnanner or show serious negligence 
in respect of employees comprûmised in a bargaining unit 






Labour Relations Act, 1995 
S. O. 1995, C. L-2 
A trade union or council of trade unions, so long as it continues 
to be entitled to represent employees in a bargaining unit, shall 
not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith in the representation of any of the employees in the unit, 
whether or not members of the trade union or of any 
constituent union of the council of trade unions, as the case 
may be. 
Where, pursuant to a collective agreement, a trade union is 
engaged in the selection, referral, assignment, designation or 
scheduling of persons to employrnent, it shall not act in a 
manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
The Labour Relations Act 
R.S.M. 1987, c. L-10 as amended 
Every bargaining agent which is a pamy to a collective 
agreement, and every person acting on behalf of the bargaining 
agent, which or who, in representing the rights of any 
employee under the collective agreement, 
(a) in the case of the dismissai of the employee 
(i) acts in a manner which is arbitrary, discriminatory 
or in bad faith, or 
(ii) fails to take reasonable care to represent the 
interests of the employee; or 
(b) in any other case, acts in a manner which is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith; 
commits an unfair labour ~ractice. 
146 
Saskatchewan The Trade Union Act 




Every employee has the right to be fairly represented in 
grievance or rights arbitration proceedings under a collective 
bargaining agreement by the trade union certified to represent 
his bargaining unit in a manner that is not arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Labour Relations Code 
S.A. 1988, c. L-1.2 as amended 
(1) No trade union or person acting on behaif of a trade 
union shall deny an employee or former employee who is or 
was in the bargaining unit the right to be fairly represented by 
the trade union with respect to his nghts under the collective 
agreement. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not render a trade union liable to an 
employee for hancial loss to the ernployee if 
(a) the made union acted in good faith in representing 
the employee, or 
(b) the loss was as the result of the employee's own 
conduct . 
(3) When a cornplaint is made in respect of an alleged denial 
of fair representation by a trade union under subsection (1), the 
Board may extend the time for the taking of any step in the 
grievance procedure under a collective agreement, 
notwithstanding the expiration of that tirne, subject to any 
conditions that the Bcrrd may prescribe, if the Board is 
satisfied that 
(a) the denial of fair representation has resulted in loss 
of employment or substantial amounts of work by the 
employee or former employee, 
(b) there are reasonable grounds for the extension, and 
(c) the empioyer will not be substantially prejudiced 
by the extension, either as a result of an order that the 
trade union compensate the employer for any financial 
Ioss or otherwise. 
British Columbia Labour Relations Code 
S.B.C. 1992, c. 82 as amended 
Sec. 12 (1) A trade union or council of trade unions shall not act in 
a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith 
(a) in representing any of the employees in an 
appropriate bargaining unit, or 
(b) in the referral of persons to empioyment 
whether or not the employees or persons are rnembers of the 
trade union or a constituent union of the council of trade 
unions. 
(2) It is not a violation of subsection (1) for a trade union to 
enter into an agreement under which 
(a) an employer is permitted to hire by name certain 
trade union members, 
(b) a hiring preference is provided to trade union 
members resident in a particular geographic area, or 
(c) an employer is permitted to hire by name persons 
to be engaged to perform supewisory duties. 
(3) An ernployers' organization shall not act in a manner that 
is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith in representing any 






HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
Canadian Human Rights Act 
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 as amended 
It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, 
(a) to refuse to employ or continue to employ any 
individual, or 
(b) in the course of employment, to differentiate 
adversely in relation to an ernployee, 
on a prohïbited ground of discrimination. 
(1) It is a discriminatory practice for an employee 
organization on a prohibited ground of discrimination 
(a) to exclude an individual from full membership in 
the organization; 
(b) to expel or suspend a member of the organization; 
or 
(c) tu limit, segregate, classify or otherwise act in 
relation to an individuai in a way that would deprive the 
individuai of employment opportunities, or limit 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
the stams of the individual, where the individual is a 
member of the organization or where any of the 
obligations of the organization pursuant to a collective 
agreement relate to the individual. 
Exception 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (l), it is not a discriminatory 
practice for an employee organization to exclude, expel or 
suspend an individual fiom membership in the organization 
because that individual has reached the normal age of 
retirement for individuals working in positions similar to the 
position of that individual. 
Dennition of "employee organizatiodl 
(3) For the purposes of this section and sections 10 and 60, 
"employee organization" includes a trade union or other 
organization of employees or local thereof, the purposes of 
which include the negotiation, on behalf of employees, of the 
terms and conditions of employment with employers. 
Newfoundland Human Riehts Code 
R.S.N. 1990, C. H-14 
Sec. 9 (1) An employer, or person acting on behalf of an employer, 
shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ or otherwise 
discriminate against a person in regard to employment or a term 
or condition of employment because of 
(a) that person's race, religion, religious creed, 
political opinion, colour or ethnic, national or social 
origin, sex, marital status , physical disability or mental 
disabiiity; or 
@) that person's age, if that person has reached the 
age of 19 years and has not reached the age of 65 years, 
but this subsection does not apply to the expression of a 




(2) An employer, or a person acting on behalf of an 
employer shall not use, in the hiring or recruitment of persons 
for employment, an employment agency that discriminates 
against persons seeking employment because of their race, 
religion, religious creed, political opinion, colour or ethnic, 
national or social origin, sex, marital status, physical disability 
or mental disability . 
(3) A trade union shall not exclude a person fiom full 
membership or expel or suspend or otherwise discriminate 
agauist 1 of its mernbers or discriminate against a person in 
regard to his or her employment by an employer, because of 
(a) that person's race, religion, religious creed, 
political opinion, colour or ethnie, national or social 
ongin, sex, marital status, physical disability or mental 
disability; or 
(b) that persons' age, if that person has attained the 
age of 19 years and has not reached the age of 65 years. 
Human Rights Act 
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 
O<) "person" includes an employer, employers ' 
organization, emplo yees ' organization, professional 
association, business or trade association, whether acting 
directly or indirectly, alone or with another, or by the 
interposition of another. 
Sec. 4 For the purpose of this Act, a person discriminates where the 
person makes a distinction, whether intentional or not, based on 
a characteristic, or perceived characteristic, referred to in 
clauses (h) to (v) of subsection (1) of Section 5 that has the 
Sec. 5 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations or disadvantages on an 
individual or a class of individuals not imposed upon others or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and 
advantages avaiiable to other individuals or classes of 
individuals in society . 
(1) No person shall in respect of 
(a) the provision of or access to services or facilities; 
(b) accommodation; 
(c) the purchase or sale of property; 
(d) emplo ment  ; 
(e) volunteer public service; 
(f) a publication, broadcast or advertisement; 
(g) mernbership in a professional association, business 
or trade association, employers' organization or 
employees' organization, 








physical disability or mental disability; 
an irrational fear of contracthg an illness or 
disease; 
ethnic, national or aboriginal origin; 
farnily status; 
marital status; 
source of income; 
political belief, affiliation or activity ; 
that individual's association with another individual 
or class of individuals having characteristics referred to 
in clauses (h) to (u). 
Prince Edward Island Human Rihts  Act 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, C. H-12 
Sec. 8 No employee's organization shall exclude any individual from 
full membership or expel or suspend any of its members on a 
discriminatory basis or discriminate against any individual in 
regard to his employment by an employer. 
New Brunswick Human Rights Act 
R.S.N.B. 1973, C. H-11 
Sec. 3 (1) No employer, employers' organization or other person 
acting on behalf of an employer shall 
(a) refuse to employ or continue to employ any 
person, or 
(b) discriminate against any person in respect of 
employment or any term or condition of employment, 
because of race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry, 
place of origin, age, physical disability, mental disability, 
marital status, sexual orientation or sex. 
(2) No employment agency shall, because of race, colour, 
religion, national origin, ancestry, place of origin, age, physical 
disability, mental disability, marital status or sex, discriminate 
against any person seeking ernployment. 
(3) No trade union or employers' organization shall 
(a) exclude any person from full membership; 
(b) expel, suspend or otherwise discriminate against 
any of its members, or 
(c) discriminate against any person in respect of his 
employment by an employer, 
because of race, colour, religion, national origin, ancestry, 
place of origin, age, physical disability, mental disability, 
marital status, sexual orientation or sex. 
(4) No person shaI1 
(a) use or circulate any form of application for 
emplo yment , 
(b) publish or cause to be published any advertisement 
in comection with employment, or 
(c) make any oral or written inquiry in comection 
with employment, 
that expresses either directly or indirectly any limitation, 
specification or preference, or requires an applicant to funiish 
any information as to race, colour, religion, national origin, 
ancestry, place of ongin, age, physicai disability, mental 
disability, marital status, semai orientation or sex. 
(5) Notwithstanding subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4), a 
limitation, specification or preference on the basis of race, 
colour, religion, nationai origin, ancestry, place of origin, age, 
physical disability, enta1 disability, marital status, sexual 
orientation or sex shall be permitted if such limitation, 
specification or preference is based upon a bona jide 
occupational qualification as determined by the Commission. 
(6) The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to 
age do not apply to 
(a) the tennination of employment or a refusal to 
employ because of the terms or conditions of any bona 
fide retirement or pension plan; 
(b) the operation of the terms or conditions of any 
bona fide retirement or pension plan that have the effect 
of a minimum service requirement; or 
(c) the operation of terms or conditions of any bona 
jïde group or employee insurance plan. 
(6.1) The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to 
age do not apply to a limitation, specification, exclusion, denial 
or preference in relation to a person who has not attained the 
age of majority if the limitation, specification, exclusion, deniai 
or preference is required or authorized by an Act of the 
Legislanue or a regulation made under that Act. 
(7) The provisions of subsections (l), (2), (3) and (4) as to 
physical disability and mental disability do not apply to 
(a) the termination of employment or a refusal to 
employ because of a bomjide qualification based on the 
nature of the work or the circumstance of the place of 
work in relation to the physical disability or mental 
disability, as determineci by the Commission; or 
(b) the operation of terms or conditions of any bona 
fide group or employee insurance plan. 
Charter of Human Ri&& and Freedoms 
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, as amended 
Sec. 17 No one may practice discrimination in respect of the admission, 
enjoyment of benefits, suspension or expulsion of a person to, 
of or from an association of employers or employees or any 
professionai corporation or association of persons carrying on 
the same occupation. 
Ontario Human Rijzhts Code 
R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19 as amended 
Sec. 17 (1) A right of a person under this Act is not infiinged for the 
reason only that the person is incapable of perfonning or 
fuifilling the essential duties or requirements attending the 
exercise of the right because of handicap. 
(2) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall 
not find a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs 
of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship 
on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, 
considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and 
health and safety requirements, if any. 
Sec. 24 (1) The right under section 5 to equal treatment with respect 
to ernployment is not infringed where, 
(a) a religious , philanthropie, educational, fkatemal or 
social institution or organization that is primarily engaged 
in serving the interests of persons identified by their 
race, ancestry, place or origin, colour, ethnic origin, 
creed, sex, age, marital s m s  or handicap employs only 
or gives preference in employment to, persons similarly 
identified if the qualification is a reasonable and bona 
fide qualification because of the nature of the 
emplo yrnent ; 
(b) the discrimination in employment is for reasons of 
age, sex, record of offences or marital status if the age, 
sex, record of offences or marital status of the applicant 
is a reasonable and bonafide qualification because of the 
nature of the employment; 
(c) an individual person refused to employ another for 
reasons of any prohibited ground of discrimination in 
section 5, where the primary duty of the employment is 
attending to the medical or personal needs of the person 
or of an il1 child or an aged, inform or ill spouse or 
other relative of the person; or 
(d) an employer gants or withholds employment or 
advancement in employment to a person who is the 
spouse, child or parent of the employer or an employee. 
Reasonable Accommodation 
(2) The Commission, the board of inquiry or a court shall 
not find that a qualification under clause (l)(b) is reasonable 
and bonafide uniess it is satisfied that the circumstances of the 
person cannot be accomrnodated without undue hardship on the 
person responsible for accommodating those circumstances 
considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and 
health and safety requirernents, if any. 
Manitoba The Human Rights Code 
C.C.S.M., C .  H-175 
S.M. 1987, c. 44 
Sec. 12 For the purpose of interpreting and applying sections 13 to 18, 
the right to discriminate where bona fide and reasonable cause 
exists for the discrimination, or where the discrimination is 
based upon bow fide and reasonable requirements or 
qualifications, does not extend to the failure to make reasonable 
accommodation within the rneaning of clause 9(l)(d). 
Sec. 13 (5) No person who undermkes, with or without 
compensation, to 
(a) obtain any other person for an employment or 
occupation with a third person; or 
@) obtain an employment or occupation for any other 
person; or 
(c) test, train or evaluate any other person for an 
employment or occupation; or 
(d) refer or recommend any other person for an 
employment or occupation; or 
(e) refer or recornmend any other person for testing, 
training or evaluation for an employment or occupation; 
shall discriminate when doing so, unless the discrimination is 
based upon bona fide and reasonable requirements or 
qualifications for the employment or occupation. 
(6) No made union, employer, employers ' organization, 
occupational association, professional association or trade 
association, and no member of any such union, organization or 
association, shall 
(a) discriminate in respect of the right to mernbership 
or any other aspect of membership in the union, 
organization or association; or 
(b) negotiate on behalf of any other person in respect 
of, or agree on behalf of any other person to, an 
agreement that discriminates; 
unless bona fide and reasonable cause exists for the 
discrimination. 
Saskatchewan The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 
S.S. 1979, C. S-24.1 
Sec. 17 Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to 
membership, and al1 the benefits appertaining to membership, 
in any professiona. society or other occupationai association 
without discrimination because of his or their race, creed, 
religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, famiiy status, marital 
status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry, place of ongin or 
receipt of public assistance. 
Sec. 18 No trade union shail exclude any person fkom full membership 
or expel, suspend or otherwise discriminate against any of its 
members, or discriminate against any person in regard to 
ernployment by any employer, because of the race, creed, 
religion, colour, sex, sexual orientation, family status, marital 
status, disability, age, nationality, ancestry, place of ongin or 
receipt of public assistance by that person or rnember. 
Alberta Individual's Ri9hts Protection Act 
R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 as amended 
Sec. 10 No trade union, employers' organization or occupational 
association shall 
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(a) exclude any person from membership in it, 
(b) expel or suspend any member of it, or 
(c) discnminate against any person or member, 
because of the race, religious beliefs, colour , gender , physical 
disability , mental disability , marital status, age, ancestry or 
place of ongin of that person or member. 
British Columbia Human Rkhts Code 
S.B.C. 1984, c. 22 as arnended 
Sec. 9 No trade union, employers' organization or occupation 
association shall 
(a) exclude any person from membership, 
(b) expel or suspend any member, or 
(c) discriminate against any person or member 
because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of ongin, political 
belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental 
disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or 
member, or because that person or member has been convicted 
of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated 
to the employment or intended membership. 
Canadian Cases 
Bell v. Co& (Hwnan Righis Commission) (1996) 140 D .L.R. (4th) 
193 (S.C.C.). 
Cooper v. Canadan Humn Rights Commission (1996) 140 D.L.R. 
(4th) 193 (S.C.C.). 
Bhinder and Canadiun Narional Railway (1985) 23 D .L.R. (4th) 48 1 
(S.C.C.).  
Blueberry River lndian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Nonhem Development) (1993 151 N.R. 241 (Fed. C.A.); 
ovemuned [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344. 
Brorherhood of Maintenance and Wq Employees and Canadian 
PaczjTc Ltd. (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (S.C.C.). 
Butt v. United Steelworkers of America (1993), 106 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 
181 (Nfld. S.C.)(T.D.). 
Burke v. Perry and Perry, [1963] S.C.R. 379. 
C.N.R. and Canadan Humn Rights Commission (1983), 147 D. L. R. 
(3d) 312 (Fed. C.A.); overturned (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481 
(S.C.C.). 
Campbell v. Pickard (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 152 (Man. C.A.). 
Ca& v. Canada S temhip  Lines Ltd., [1950] S.C.R. 532. 
Canudian Aero Service v. O 'Malley, [1973] S .C .R. 592. 
Canadian M e r c h  Service Guild v. w o n  Cl98 11 C .A. 43 1 (Que. 
C.A.); ovemirned [1984] 1 S.C.R. 509; (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 641 
(S.C.C.). 
162 
&mon Enterprises v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534. 
Central Alberta Dairy Prod. v. Albena Hwnan Rights Commission 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 489. 
Centrai Okanagan Schod District #23 v. R e ~ u d  (1992), 92 C .L.L.C. 
17032 (S.C.C.); [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970. 
Centre Hospitalier Regina Ltee. v. P d  'homme (1990, 69 D.L.R. 
(4th) 609 (S.C.C.). 
Chauffeurs. Teamters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry et al 494 
U.S. 558 (1990) 
City of Kamloops v. Nieken [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2. 
Clark v. Pïumbers and Pipefiners Union. Local 213 (1988), 89 
N.B.R. (2d) 425, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1989), 91 
N.B.R. (2d) 90n (S.C.C.). 
Coggs v. Bernard (1703), 2 M. Rayrn. 909 (1702), 92 E.R. 107. 
Collins v. Transport & Allied Workers Union, Local 855 (1991), 92 
C.L.L.C. 14018; 94 Nfld. & P.E.1.R 346 (Nfld.S.C.)(T.D.). 
Copration de Batteries Cegelect [1978] T.T. 328. 
Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Onrario (Labour Relations Board) (199 l), 8 1 
D.L.R. (4th) 121 (S.C.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5.  
Dés, c. Montréal (Nord) [1991 A.Q. No. 1540. 
Dickason v. University of Alberta, [1992] 2 S .C .R. 1 103. 
Dominion Canners Ltd. v. Cast~mcz, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 551 (S.C.C.). 
Donovan v. City of Suint John (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 110 
(N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.). 
Douglas/KwmtZen Faculty Association v. Douglar College ( 1  99O), 77 
D.L.R. (4th) 94. 
Dutcher v. Constmm'on and General Lobourers & General Workers 
Union, Local IO79 (1990), 110 N.B.R. (2d)  368 (Q.B.D.). 
Fairley & Stevens (1966) Ltd. v. Goldrworthy (l973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 
554 (NSSC) (T.D.) 1.  
Fisher v. Pembenon (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d)  521 (B.C.S.C.). 
F m e  v. Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81 (S.C.C.). 
Gendron v. Supply & Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of 
CatMdQ, Local 50057 (199û), 109 N.R. 321 (S.C.C.). 
Goodyear TNe, [1956] S.C.R. 610. 
Goulais v. Resroule Estate, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 365. 
Guerin v. m e  Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
Haley v. Canadian Airline Employees ' Association [ 19801 8 1 
C.L.L.C. 16070; [1980] 3 Can. L.R.B.R. 501. 
Harper v. Prescott, [1940] S.C .R. 688. 
Hedges v. Canadian Auto Works (1997), 97 C.L.L.C. 220-023 
(P.E.I.S.C.)(T.D.). 
Hodgkinson v. Simr (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). 
Ho lhd  v. City of Toronto, [1927] S .C .R. 242. 
Jackson v. Millar, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 225. 
Just v. British Columbia [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228. 
Kelso v. The Queen, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 199; 120 D.L.R. (3d) 1 
(S.C.C.). 
Lac Minerais Ltd. v. International Corona, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; 61 
D.L.R. (4th) 14 (S.C.C.). 
Laviolette v. United Brotherhood of Capenters & Joiners of America, 
Local 1023 Q.L. Ref: [1998] N.B.J. No. 130 (C.A.). 
Leclair v. S.A.T.A.P., Local 4 (1989), 103 N.B.R. (2d) 43 (Q.B.D.). 
MIV) v. M(H) and Wornen 's Legal Education and Action Fund ( 1  WZ), 
14 C.C.L.T. 1 (S.C.C.). 
McCulloch v. Murray, [1942] S.C.R. 141. 
Moldowan v . Saskatchewan Government Employees Union ( 1  993), 
108 D.L.R. (4th) 132 (Sask. Q.B.); overturned (1995), 126 D.L.R. 
(4th) 289 (Sask. C.A.). 
Mulherin v. United Steelworkers of America Local 7884 (1985), 
B.C.L.R. 347 (S.C.); overturned (1987) 37 D.L.R. (4th) 333. 
Narional Trust Co. v. Christian Convnunity of Universal Brotherhood, 
[1944] 3 D.L.R. 529 (S.C.C.), [1941] S.C.R. 601. 
Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226. 
Nova Scutia Union of Public Employees, Local 2 v. Kendall, et al 
(1996) 148 NSR (2d) 51 (T.D.); upheld (1996) 152 NSR (2d) 76 
(C.A.). 
Ontario Hwnan Rights Commission and O 'Malley v. Simpsons Sears 
Ltd. (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 332 (S.C.C.). 
Paquene c. Commission des écoles catholiques [ 19971 A. Q . No. 
1273. 
Pancch v. Nova Scotia Nurses' Union (1991), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 101 
(N.S.S.C.)(T.D.). 
R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
St. Anne Nackawic Pu@ & Paper Co. v. &nadian Paperworkers ' 
Union, Local 219 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704. 
Semenuk v. Hamilton Q .  L. Ref. [1995] O. J. no. 227 1 (O .C. J .)(Go D.). 
Stein v. The Ship Kathy K, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802. 
Sruder v. Cooper, [1951] S.C.R. 450. 
Tetreault-Gadoury v. C a d a  (Employment & Immigration 
Commission) (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th) 358, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22. 
n e  Glengoil Sreamship Co. et al v. Pikington et al (1897), 28 
S.C.R. 146. 
Thompson v. Fraser, [1955] S.C.R. 419. 
United Brorherhood of CSlrpenters & Juiners of America, Local IO23 
et al. and Lionel Lavene, et al. (1997), 98 C.L.L.C. 220-014 at 143, 
116 (N.B.Q.B.)(T.D.). 
Young et al v. United Mine Workers of America (1988), 67 Sask. R. 
39 (Q.B.); 48 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Sask. Q. B.). 
W(B) v. Mellor, Q.L. Ref. [1989] B.C.J. No. 1393 (S.C.) .  
Walker v. Cmes, [1968] S.C.R. 599. 
Wark v. Green, Boasiey and Canadian Union of Public Employees, 
b c a i  1506 (1985), 66 N.B.R. (2d) 77 (C.A.). 
American Cases 
Air Line Pilots Association v. O'Neill 499 U.S. 65 (1991). 
Bazartez v. United Transportation Union 429 F.  2d. 868, 871 (3d Cir. 
1970). 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v .  Howard 343 U.S. 768 (1952). 
Communicutions Association v. Douds 339 U .  S .  382 ( 1  950). 
Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 749 F .  2d. 1270 (9th Cir. 1982). 
Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Emern Railway 697 F .  2d. 771 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
Harris v. Schwerman Trucking Co. 668 F .  2d. 1204 (11th Cir. 1982). 
H o m n  v. h n z a  Inc. 658 F.  2d. 519 (7th Cir. 1981). 
Hwnphrey v. Moore 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
I.B.E. W., Local 801 v. N.L.R.B. 307 F. 2d. 679 0 . C .  Cir. 1962). 
Ruticka v.  General Motors Corporation 523 F.2d. 306 (6th Cir., 
1975) cert. denied 464 U.S. 982. 
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co. 323 US. 192 (1944). 
Syres Oil Workers International Union 323 F .  (2d.) 739 (5 Cir. 1955), 
350 U.S. 892 (1955). 
Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co. 533 F .  2d. 952 (5th Cir. 1976). 
l2ompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 3 16 F. 2d. 210 
(4th Cir. 1963). 
167 
Tram World Airlines Inc. v. Hardsen 432 U. S .  63 (1 977) Cir . 1963). 
United Steel Workers of America v. Rawson 495 US. 362 (1990). 
Vaca v. Sipes 386 US. 171 (1967). 
Venci. v. I ~ e m a t i o ~ t ~ i  Union of ûpermgng Engineers 137 F.3d. 420 
(6th C ir . 1998). 
Wallace Corporation v .  Nationai Labour Relations Board 323 U.S . 
248 (1944). 
Wyatt v .  Interstate & Ocean Transport Co. 623 F. 2d. 888 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
British Cases 
Chandler v. Crane, C h B s m  & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164. 
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562; [1932] Ai1 E.R. 1. 
Lloyd's Bank v. Bwidy [1975] Q.B. 326. 
Nocton v .  Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932. 
Secondarv Materials 
Texts 
Adams Canadian Laoour Arbination, 2nd Edition, Canada Law Book 
Inc. Aurora: 1998. 
England, Christie & Christie, Employment Law in Canada 3rd 
edition, Butterworths, Toronto: 1998. 
Linden, Canadian Tort Lao Butterworths, 6th Edition, Toronto: 
1987. 
Martin H .  Malin, Individual Rights Within the Union, The Bureau of  
National Affairs Inc . , Chicago: 1987. 
Robert Joseph Pothier, Osuvres de Pothier, M .  Simein, Paris 182 1. 
B. L. Adell, The Duty of Fair Representuzion: Effective Protection 
for Individual Rights in Collective Agreements (1970) 25 
Indus trial Relations Indussielles 602. 
Raj Anand, H N  Testing in the Unionized Workplace: m e  
Accommodation Challenges Posed by AIDS, 1 Canadian Labour 
Law Journal 100. 
Beth Bilson, Fencing Collective Bargaining: A Comment on St. 
Anne Nackawic (1988) 52 Saskatchewan Law Review 143. 
Alfred W .  Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: 
Union-Management Authority versus Employee Auionomy ( 1  959) 
13 Rutgers Law Review 631. 
Mary Cornish and Harriett Simand, Religious Accomodation in the 
Workplace, 1 Canadian Labour Law Journal 167. 
Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement (1956) 69 Harvard 
Law Review 60 1. 
Neva S. Flaherty, Detemoning StaltdCIrds For a Union 's Duty of Fair 
Representazion: me Case for Ordinary Negligence (1980) 65 
Comell Law Review 634. 
H .  Pamck Glenn, The Commun Law in Canada (1995) 74 C.B.R. 
261. 
Isaacson, Ilie Duty of Fuir Representation: Protecting the Protected 
from llteir Protectors (1980) 6 Employee Relations Law 
Journal 1. 
Robert Kerr, Jurisdiction of the Courts over Arbitrable Disputes: St. 
Anne Nackawic h t l p  & Paper Co. Ltd. v. Canadian 
Paperworkers' Union, Local 219, [1987] 66 Canadian Bar 
Review 169. 
Michael Lynch and Richard Ellis, Unions and n e  Duty to 
Accommodate, 1 Canadian Labour Law Journal 238. 
J. Gordon Petrie and Jarnie Petrie, Paper Presented to Mid-Winter 
Meeting of Canadian Bar Association, N.B. Branch, 1995. 
Sandy Price, Accommodating Women in Employment: me Limitations 
of a Traditional Approach, 1 Canadian Labour Law Journal 
140. 
Clyde W. Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and 
Arbitration (1965) 37 New York University Law Review 362. 
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence (1959), 12 Vand. L. 
Rev. 755. 
Gary A. Zabos , Fair Representation: ï3e  "Arbitrary, Discrimimtory, 
or Bad Fairh" Test in Ciurada (1978) 43 Saskatchewan Law 
Review 19. 
l MAGE EVALUATION 
TEST TARGET (QA-3) 
APPLIED 2 IMAGE. lnc 
1653 East Main Street - -- - Rochester. NY 14609 USA -- - Phone: 71 6/482M300 -  Faxr 71 W28û-5989 
